Nice work, Brian. Looks good to me! 
________________________________________
From: Brian Campbell [bcampb...@pingidentity.com]
Sent: Wednesday, September 2, 2020 3:41 PM
To: Justin Richer
Cc: Takahiko Kawasaki; Torsten Lodderstedt; oauth
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] WGLC Review of PAR
Thanks Torsten, Taka, and Justin,

I took the revised text from Justin and tweaked it with some typo cleanup and 
minor adjustments to make what is hopefully a final proposal below. I had a 
similar feeling about the last paragraph not really fitting but don't have a 
better location to suggest so am just leaving it.

2.4. Management of Client Redirect URIs

While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri 
values in certain circumstances, or for the authorization server to apply its 
own matching semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the 
authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] 
as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an authorization server 
exactly match the redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs 
previously established for a particular client. This is a means for early 
detection of client impersonation attempts and prevents token leakage and open 
redirection. As a downside, this can make client management more cumbersome 
since the redirect URI is typically the most volatile part of a client policy.

The exact matching requirement MAY be relaxed by the authorization server for a 
confidential client using pushed authorization requests since the authorization 
server authenticates the client before the authorization process starts and 
thus ensures it is interacting with the legitimate client. The authorization 
server MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values that were not 
previously registered with the authorization server. This will give the client 
more flexibility (e.g. to mint distinct redirect URI values per authorization 
server at runtime) and can simplify client management. It is at the discretion 
of the authorization server to apply restrictions on supplied redirect_uri 
values, e.g. the authorization server MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow 
only a query parameter to vary at runtime.

The ability to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in 
situations where client ids and corresponding credentials and policies are 
managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certificates containing client 
permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an 
authorization server trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an 
additional registration step.

On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 8:09 AM Justin Richer 
<jric...@mit.edu<mailto:jric...@mit.edu>> wrote:
The real conflict here is with the BCP and 2.1, both of which adopt the 
stricter matching semantics for redirect URIs than 6749 does on its own. This 
section would be needed to clarify how they relate to each other. That said, I 
think adding some of Taka’s observations to Torsten’s text wouldn’t hurt:

2.4. Management of redirect_uri

While OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] allows clients to use unregistered redirect_uri 
values in certain circumstances, or for the AS to apply its own matching 
semantics to the redirect_uri value presented by the client at the 
authorization endpoint, the OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] 
as well as OAuth 2.1 [I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the 
redirect_uri parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established 
for a particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to 
impersonate a client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a 
downside, it makes client management more complex since the redirect URI is 
typically the most volatile part of a client policy.

This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS if a confidential client uses pushed 
authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before the 
authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the legit 
client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not 
previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibility 
(e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client management 
much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restriction on 
redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only 
a query parameter to vary at runtime.

I also feel like this paragraph belongs in a different section outside of here. 
I’m not sure where, but it doesn’t quite seem to fit, to me. It’s not the end 
of the world if it stays here though as it’s a decent view on the “why".

The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful in 
situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies are 
managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing client 
permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an AS 
trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional 
registration step.

 — Justin

On Sep 1, 2020, at 11:05 PM, Takahiko Kawasaki 
<t...@authlete.com<mailto:t...@authlete.com>> wrote:

Under existing specifications (RFC 6749, OIDC Core 1.0 and FAPI), a client can 
choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without registering it only when all the 
following conditions are satisfied.

1. The client type of the client is "confidential". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 
requires that public clients register redirect URIs.)
2. The flow is not "implicit". (RFC 6749 Section 3.1.2.2 requires that 
confidential clients utilizing the implicit grant type register redirect URIs.)
3. The authorization request is not an OIDC request. (OIDC Core 1.0 Section 
3.1.2.1 requires that redirect_uri match a pre-registered one.)
4. The authorization request is not a FAPI request. (FAPI Part 1 Section 5.2.2 
Clause 8 requires that redirect URIs be pre-registered.)

In short, under existing specifications, pure RFC-6749 authorization-code-flow 
requests from confidential clients can choose an arbitrary redirect_uri without 
registering it. Once OIDC or FAPI is used, existing specifications require 
pre-registration of redirect URIs. I'm not sure but if PAR's "redirect_uri 
Management" is going to introduce rules that conflict with existing 
specifications, it is better to list the conflicts explicitly in the section.

Best Regards,
Takahiko Kawasaki


On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 3:48 AM Torsten Lodderstedt 
<torsten=40lodderstedt....@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40lodderstedt....@dmarc.ietf.org>>
 wrote:
Here is my proposal for the new section:

2.4. redirect_uri Management

The OAuth Security BCP [I-D.ietf-oauth-security-topics] as well as OAuth 2.1 
[I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-1] require an AS to excactly match the redirect_uri 
parameter against the set of redirect URIs previously established for a 
particular client. This is a means to early detect attempts to impersonate a 
client and prevent token leakage and open redirection. As a downside, it makes 
client management more complex since the redirect URI is typically the most 
volatile part of a client policy.

This requirement MAY be relaxed by the AS, if a confidential client uses pushed 
authorization requests since the AS authenticates the client before the 
authorization process starts and that way ensures it interacts with the legit 
client. The AS MAY allow such clients to specify redirect_uri values not 
previously registered with the AS. This will give the client more flexibility 
(e.g. to mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client management 
much easier. It is at the discretion of the AS to apply restriction on 
redirect_uri values, e.g. the AS MAY require a certain URI prefix or allow only 
a query parameter to vary at runtime.

Note: The aibility to set up transaction specific redirect URIs is also useful 
in situations where client ids and correspoding credentials and policies are 
managed by a trusted 3rd party, e.g. via client certifiates containing client 
permissions. Such an externally managed client could interact with an AS 
trusting the respective 3rd party without the need for an additional 
registration step.

> On 29. Aug 2020, at 17:22, Justin Richer 
> <jric...@mit.edu<mailto:jric...@mit.edu>> wrote:
>
> I completely agree with the utility of the function in question here and it 
> needs to be included. I’m in favor of creating a dedicated section for 
> redirect_uri management, so that we can explain exactly how and why to relax 
> the requirement from core OAuth. In addition, I think we want to discuss that 
> the AS might have its own restrictions on which redirect URIs an 
> authenticated client might be able to use. For example, registering a client 
> with a Redirect URI prefix, or allowing only a query parameter to vary at 
> runtime. All of these can be enforced in PAR because the client is presenting 
> its authentication, as you point out, so the AS can determine which policies 
> should apply.
>
> — Justin
>
>> On Aug 29, 2020, at 7:52 AM, Torsten Lodderstedt 
>> <tors...@lodderstedt.net<mailto:tors...@lodderstedt.net>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   ¶6: Does the AS really have "the ability to authenticate and authorize 
>>> clients”? I think what we mean here is "the ability to authenticate clients 
>>> and validate client requests”, but I’m not positive of the intent.
>>>
>>> I think the intent is that the AS can check whether a client is authorized 
>>> to make a particular authorization request (specific scopes, response type, 
>>> etc.). But checking authorization to request authorization is confusing 
>>> wording. I think your working is less confusing and still allows for the 
>>> intent.
>>>
>>> I'll let Torsten interject if he feels differently as I think he originally 
>>> wrote the text in question.
>>
>> that was the original intent. I think “validate" is fine.
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>   ¶7: I’m not sure I buy this example. Even if the clientID is managed 
>>> externally, the association with a set or pattern of allowed redirect URIs 
>>> is still important, and the AS will need to know what that is. I think this 
>>> example could lead an AS developer to (erroneously and dangerously) 
>>> conclude that they don’t have to check any other values in a request, 
>>> including scope and redirect URI. It’s important that DynReg doesn’t 
>>> alleviate that issue, but removal of DynReg doesn’t really change things in 
>>> that regard. Suggest removing example or reworking paragraph.
>>>
>>> I'm going to have to defer to Torsten on this because, to be honest, I'm 
>>> not too sure about it myself. I tend to lean towards thinking the draft 
>>> would be better off without it.
>>>
>>
>> In the traditional authorization flow, the redirect_uri serves as way to 
>> make sure the AS is really talking to the legit client and the allowed 
>> redirect_uri values are determined by the legit client at registration time 
>> (might be manually).
>>
>> With PAR, we have a much stronger means to ensure the AS is talking to the 
>> legit client. That’s why I don’t see an issue with letting the client set a 
>> per transaction redirect_uri. This will give the client more flexibility 
>> (mint AS-specific redirect URIs on the fly) and makes client management much 
>> easier since redirect URIs are the most volatile part of a client policy.
>>
>> It also makes use of OAuth much easier in deployments where client 
>> identities are managed by external entities (even without any idea of 
>> OAuth). A prominent example is open banking in the EU (aka PSD2). The 
>> (technical) identity of any PSD2-licensed client is asserted by an eIDAS 
>> compliant CA in a special X.509 certificate. Those certificates contain the 
>> permissions (access to account information and/or payment initiation 
>> allowed) and the identity (member state specific). But they don’t contain 
>> OAuth policy values. Nevertheless, the regulation requires any financial 
>> institution in the EU to at runtime, without any registration, to accept and 
>> process calls from any licensed PSD2 clients.
>>
>> There are two ways to cope with it in OAuth context:
>> a) use dynamic client registration with the X.509 cert as credential. 
>> Unfortunately, RFC 7591 does not support other client authentication means 
>> then an initial access token. Beside that, it would violate the text of the 
>> regulation.
>> b) establish a redirect URL with every transaction. This is the recommended 
>> approach in at least one of the PSD2 specs.
>>
>> PAR is a clean way to solve that problem.
>>
>> I don’t want this text to cause confusing. On the other hand this potential 
>> of PAR is way too important to not mention it at all. What about moving it 
>> into a special section "redirect_uri management”?
>>
>>>
>>
>

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