Hi all,
Aaron, Dick, Torsten and I today discussed the downgrade attacks on PKCE
[1] and how to mitigate them in OAuth 2.1 and 2.0. We came to the
conclusion that we have two options:
*1. "Static" Solution*
For every client_id that is registered with an AS, the AS MUST either
always enforce the use of PKCE or always enforce the use of nonce.
Whether PKCE or nonce is enforced can be part of the client registration
or configured in other ways.
In other words: A single client is not allowed to switch between using
PKCE and using nonce.
Note that the client is allowed to use the respective other mechanism on
top of the enforced one.
Properties:
* Easy to understand mitigation.
* Implementation is mainly a new data field and a check in the
authorization request.
* Not compatible to deployments where clients sometimes use nonce and
sometimes use PKCE with the same client_id. *
***
**
*2. "Dynamic" Solution*
Each AS that supports PKCE MUST check whether a code challenge is
contained in the authorization request. This information MUST be bound
to the code that is issued.
When a code arrives at the token endpoint, the AS MUST do the following
check:
1. If there was a code_challenge in the authorization request for which
this code was issued, there must be a code_verifier in the token
request and it must be verified according to RFC7636. (This is no
change from the current behavior in RFC7636.)
2. If there was no code_challenge in the authorization request, any
request to the token endpoint containing a code_verifier MUST be
rejected.
Properties:
* No change in behavior needed for properly implemented clients.
Backwards compatible for all existing deployments.
* Implementation is mainly some logic for the authorization endpoint,
token endpoint, and a new data field in the authorization session
maintained by the AS.
* Slightly more complex to implement for the AS, maybe.
We would like to hear the feedback from the working group on these two
solutions before proceeding to propose wording for the affected documents.
[1] https://danielfett.de/2020/05/16/pkce-vs-nonce-equivalent-or-not/
-Daniel
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