John, thanks, much appreciated! On 11/01/2020 21:36, John Bradley wrote: > > Yes JAR is not prohibiting paramater replication in the header. > > I will see if i can add something in final edits to call that out. > > John B. > > On 1/11/2020 6:16 AM, Vladimir Dzhuvinov wrote: >> >> Thanks Mike for the rfc7519 section-5.3 >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-5.3> pointer. Can this >> parameter replication be used for client_id or the client_id ass >> "iss" even though it isn't explicitly mentioned in the JAR spec? >> >> On 11/01/2020 02:58, John Bradley wrote: >>> Right we just don't say to put the iss there in OIDC if it's >>> symetricly encrypted. >> >> OIDC doesn't have the symmetric key selection issue, I suppose that >> why the possibility to replicate params to the JWE header isn't >> mentioned at all. OIDC requires the top-level query params to >> represent a valid OAuth 2.0 request, and there client_id is required. >> If the client_id is present the client registration together with any >> present client_secret can be retrieved. >> >> I reread the JAR spec, this is the only place that mentions handling >> of symmetric JWE. >> >> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-20#section-10.2 >> >>> (b) Verifying that the symmetric key for the JWE encryption is the >>> correct one if the JWE is using symmetric encryption. >> >> >> Vladimir >> >> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020, 9:41 PM Mike Jones >>> <michael.jo...@microsoft.com <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>> >>> wrote: >>> >>> The technique of replicating JWT claims that need to be publicly >>> visible in an encrypted JWT in the header is defined at >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-5.3. (Thanks to >>> Dick Hardt for bringing this need to my attention as we were >>> finishing the JWT spec.) >>> >>> >>> >>> -- Mike >>> >>> >>> >>> *From:* OAuth <oauth-boun...@ietf.org >>> <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>> *On Behalf Of * John Bradley >>> *Sent:* Friday, January 10, 2020 2:15 PM >>> *To:* Vladimir Dzhuvinov <vladi...@connect2id.com >>> <mailto:vladi...@connect2id.com>> >>> *Cc:* IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> >>> *Subject:* [EXTERNAL] Re: [OAUTH-WG] JWT Secured Authorization >>> Request (JAR) vs OIDC request object >>> >>> >>> >>> The intent was to do that, but specs change once the OAuth WG >>> and IESG get there hands on them. >>> >>> >>> >>> Being backwards compatible with OIDC is not a compelling >>> argument to the IESG. >>> >>> >>> >>> We were mostly thinking of asymmetric encryption. >>> >>> >>> >>> Specifying puting the issuer and or the audience in the headder >>> has come up in the past but probably is not documented. >>> >>> >>> >>> John B >>> >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Jan 10, 2020, 6:29 PM Vladimir Dzhuvinov >>> <vladi...@connect2id.com <mailto:vladi...@connect2id.com>> wrote: >>> >>> Yes, putting the client_id into the JWE header is a way >>> around the need >>> to have the client_id outside the JWE as top-level authZ >>> request parameter. >>> >>> Unfortunately this work around isn't mentioned anywhere, I >>> just checked >>> the most recent draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-20. >>> >>> Our DDoS attack mitigation (for OIDC request_uri) also >>> relies on the >>> presence of client_id as top-level parameter, together with >>> requiring >>> RPs to register their request_uri's (so that we don't need >>> to build and >>> store an index of all request_uri's). I just had a look at >>> "DDoS Attack >>> on the Authorization Server" and also realised the request_uri >>> registration isn't explicitly mentioned as attack prevention >>> ("the >>> server should (a) check that the value of "request_uri" >>> parameter does >>> not point to an unexpected location"). >>> >>> >>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-20#section-10.4.1 >>> >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Ftools.ietf.org%2Fhtml%2Fdraft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-20%23section-10.4.1&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7Cc470d4ec4bd14d481c0f08d7961a8abb%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637142913068793193&sdata=%2FvHVp68SN5CAHimqZ5jx93aOCIruxqLCRMUFCc5DSxc%3D&reserved=0> >>> >>> To be honest, I feel quite bad about the situation with JAR >>> we are in >>> now. For some reason I had the impression that OAuth JAR was >>> going to be >>> the OIDC request / request_uri for general OAuth 2.0 use, as >>> with other >>> OIDC bits that later became general purpose OAuth 2.0 specs. >>> >>> I find it unfortunate I didn't notice this when I was >>> reviewing the spec >>> in the past. >>> >>> Vladimir >>> >>> >>> On 10/01/2020 22:39, Filip Skokan wrote: >>> > Vladimir, >>> > >>> > For that very case the payload claims may be repeated in >>> the JWE protected header. An implementation wanting to >>> handle this may look for iss/client_id there. >>> > >>> > Odesláno z iPhonu >>> > >>> >> 10. 1. 2020 v 21:19, Vladimir Dzhuvinov >>> <vladi...@connect2id.com <mailto:vladi...@connect2id.com>>: >>> >> >>> >> I just realised there is one class of JARs where it's >>> practially >>> >> impossible to process the request if merge isn't supported: >>> >> >>> >> The client submits a JAR encrypted (JWT) with a shared >>> key. OIDC allows >>> >> for that and specs a method for deriving the shared key >>> from the >>> >> client_secret: >>> >> >>> >> >>> https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#Encryption >>> >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fopenid.net%2Fspecs%2Fopenid-connect-core-1_0.html%23Encryption&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7Cc470d4ec4bd14d481c0f08d7961a8abb%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637142913068793193&sdata=soK9t7pzu504iILuDNFnG%2BMLxZPP2pN6ugEJ4ZOpqd4%3D&reserved=0> >>> >> >>> >> If the JAR is encrypted with the client_secret, and there >>> is no >>> >> top-level client_id parameter, there's no good way for >>> the OP to find >>> >> out which client_secret to get to try to decrypt the JWE. >>> Unless the OP >>> >> keeps an index of all issued client_secret's. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> OP servers which require request_uri registration >>> >> (require_request_uri_registration=true) and don't want to >>> index all >>> >> registered request_uri's, also have no good way to >>> process a request_uri >>> >> if the client_id isn't present as top-level parameter. >>> >> >>> >> >>> >> Vladimir >>> >> >>> >> >>> >>> On 10/01/2020 20:13, Torsten Lodderstedt wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>>>> Am 10.01.2020 um 16:53 schrieb John Bradley >>> <ve7...@ve7jtb.com <mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com>>: >>> >>>> I think Torsten is speculating that is not a feature >>> people use. >>> >>> I’m still trying to understand the use case for merging >>> signed and unsigned parameters. Nat once explained a use >>> case, where a client uses parameters signed by a 3rd party >>> (some „certification authority“) in combination with >>> transaction-specific parameters. Is this being done in the >>> wild? >>> >>> >>> >>> PS: PAR would work with both modes. >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >>> https:// >>> >>> <https://nam06.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ietf.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Foauth&data=02%7C01%7CMichael.Jones%40microsoft.com%7Cc470d4ec4bd14d481c0f08d7961a8abb%7C72f988bf86f141af91ab2d7cd011db47%7C1%7C0%7C637142913068803145&sdata=kobH%2FsGT7ElSSUCJvu%2FbiAqnRCXx%2B4SZNJsrL%2FCuVyc%3D&reserved=0> >>>
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