+1 for tls_client_auth_root_dn, I find this name to be more exact. People may find issuer_dn ambiguous.
+1 to also make it an array Thanks! Vladimir On 15/05/17 20:42, Brian Campbell wrote: > I'll add text/clarification that the DN metadata fields being RFC4514 > string representations of DNs in the next draft. > > Given that this is a profile of use and the metadata fields are just one > way to express the binding of certificate and client, and after thinking > about it some more and not wanting to introduce too many variations, I feel > that keeping tls_client_auth_subject_dn as the subject distinguished name > of the client certificate is more straightforward and sufficient for this > case. > > Is there rough consensus to change "tls_client_auth_issuer_dn" to > "tls_client_auth_root_dn" as was suggested? The latter name makes sense to > me but I don't want to make that change without a little more input or > buy-in from the WG. So please respond one way or the other, if you've got > an opinion. > > Similarly I'm looking for some rough consensus around if a single > root/issuer is sufficient in the metadata before potentially making any > changes. Should "tls_client_auth_issuer/root_dn" remain a single DN string > value or should it be an array allowing for more than one? > > > > On Fri, Apr 21, 2017 at 6:18 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote: > >> I agree with Brian. >> >> Trying to do anything with PKIX opens up cans of worms. One of the >> reasons we have resisted to this point. >> >> However there are server to server use cases that legitimately need this. >> >> I agree that in general DN is a mess, I suspect that telling people to >> directly use the DER encoded version wont fly, so my thought was to use the >> RFC 4514 string representation that most tools produce. >> >> We did talk about subject alt DNS Names, however those may not be present >> in eIDAS certificates that some people may need to use for legal reasons, >> or if it is present it might be an email. >> >> I suspect that users of this will fall into two camps. One that has a >> small set of trusted CA that are configured out of band and any certificate >> from those roots with the correct DN is OK. >> >> The other group will be trying to do something more dynamic with SSL >> server certs (May or may not be EV) I could see those people preferring >> DNS Name subject alt, or using JWKS to publish there certs. >> >> The problem is finding the right balance of flexibility without too many >> options to confuse people. >> >> I am inclined towards DN for those that are willing to suffer the pain, >> and JWKS_uri for everyone else. One advantage of the JWKS_URI approach is >> that self signed certs should work just fine, that is something that the >> R&E people will want if they use this. >> >> For most proof of possession we should be promoting token binding as the >> most flexible approach as it also works with mobile without per instance >> registration. >> >> John B. >> >> >> On Apr 21, 2017, at 7:41 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> >> wrote: >> >> Thanks, James, for the adoption support as well as the review and >> comments. I've tried to respond to the comments inline below. >> >> On Thu, Apr 20, 2017 at 11:33 PM, Manger, James < >> james.h.man...@team.telstra.com> wrote: >> >>> I support adoption of draft-campbell-oauth-mtls. >>> >>> Now some comments on the doc: >>> >>> 1. [§2.3] The syntax of tls_client_auth_subject_dn is not specified. >>> Perhaps LDAP's "String Representation of Distinguished Names" [RFC4514]? >>> Perhaps a base64url-encoding of a DER-encoded DN? It would actually be >>> better to allow any subjectAltName to be specified, instead of a DN. >>> >> How about calling it tls_client_auth_subject and defining it as a string >> and allowing it to represent the expected subject which could be in the >> cert as the subject DN or a subjectAltName? For Subject DN and DN >> subjectAltNames it would be the "String Representation of Distinguished >> Names" and an appropriate string for the other subjectAltName types (I'll >> have to look at what's there 'cause I don't know off hand and guidance or >> suggested text is always more than welcome). >> >> >> >> >>> 2. [§2.3] Change the name of tls_client_auth_issuer_dn (maybe >>> tls_client_auth_root_dn). Given tls_client_auth_client_dn, it will be too >>> easy to assume this pair refer to the issuer and subject fields of the cert. >>> >> The accompanying text tries to make it clear that it's the root issuer but >> the tls_client_auth_issuer_dn name can certainly be changed to >> tls_client_auth_root_dn or something along those lines, if folks think the >> name in -01 is liable to cause confusion? >> >> >> >> PKI chains can be complex so the expected root might not be such a stable >>> concept. For example, the Let's Encrypt CA chains to an ISRG Root and an >>> IdenTrust DST Root [https://letsencrypt.org/certificates/]. >>> >> The goal was to provide a metadata field to express some constraint for >> what is kind of expected to be a common deployment of a number of entities >> participating in some OAuth API thing and are being issued certificates >> from a common issuer for the group of participants. >> >> Perhaps it should be an array of strings rather than a single value? >> >> Or do you have suggestions for some alternative? >> >> >> >> >>> 3. [§2.3] If a client dynamically registers a "jwks_uri" does this mean >>> the authz server MUST automatically cope when the client updates the key(s) >>> it publishes there? >>> >> If the authz server supports that kind of trust model as well as >> dynamically registration, then I would expect so, yes. >> >> >> >> >>> 4. [§3] An access token is bound to a specific client certificate. That >>> is probably ok, but does mean all access tokens die when the client updates >>> their certificate (which could be every 2 months if using Let's Encrypt). >>> This at least warrants a paragraph in the Security Considerations. >>> >> In my own mind that was implied and okay because it's likely that access >> tokens will have a shorter lifespan than certificates and refreshing or >> getting a new access token is typically easy anyhow. >> >> Anyway, it doesn't hurt to be explicit about it, can you propose some such >> text for the Security Considerations? >> >> >> >> >>> 5. [§3.1] "exp" and "nbf" values in the example need to be numbers, not >>> strings (drop the quotes). >>> >> Silly mistake on my part. Thanks for catching that. Will fix. >> >> >> >>> 6. An access token linked to a client TLS cert isn't a bearer token. The >>> spec should really define a new token_type for responses from the token >>> endpoint. That might not necessarily mean we needs a new HTTP >>> authentication scheme as well (it might just hint that "Bearer" wasn't >>> quite the right name). >>> >> Indeed "Bearer" isn't quite right and very likely a name that would be >> different with the benefit of hindsight. But other than having names on the >> wire that are more true to the nature of the tokens, I don't know that a >> new token_type or HTTP auth scheme adds value to the use cases here. >> However, they would likely make deployment of this stuff more cumbersome >> and take longer. Whereas many systems can likely plug in mutual TLS on top >> of the existing token_type and HTTP auth scheme without major changes. I'm >> strongly inclined to not introduce a new token_type and more inclined to >> not do a new HTTP auth scheme. >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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