They are mutually exclusive. However there are two options as to how the authorization endpoint would treat extra query parameters like state if they are sent.
The current text causes the AS to ignore them and not return a error. This would be more backwards compatible with the request object in OpenID Connect, however in reality it may cause connect clients to send parameters as query parameters that would be processed by a connect server that would be ignored by a OAuth server without any obvious error. There may however be subtle errors downstream from missing parameters. The other option is to have a cleaner breaking change from Connect and have the Authorization endpoint return a error if anything other than the two new parameters are sent to the authorization endpoint. I am leaning towards the latter as it is easier to debug, and wont allow incompatible Connect requests to be accepted without a error. We would have done this in Connect but couldn’t drop required parameters from OAuth in a Connect spec. The downside for the latter is that the client would need to know if the AS is supporting The Connect version or the OAuth version. One of the typical conundrums around how to deal with doing the best going forward thing vs not blowing up older implementations. In the current proposal a client could put the required parameters both places and the same request would work on servers supporting both the Connect and OAuth versions. John B. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: Torsten Lodderstedt Sent: March 30, 2017 11:01 PM To: John Bradley Cc: Nat Sakimura; Nat Sakimura; IETF oauth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt I had assumed using the request object is mutual exclusive to use of URI query parameters. Did I misinterpret the draft? Am 30.03.2017 um 22:40 schrieb John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com>: It is a trade off between compatibility with Connect and possible configuration errors. In reality it may not be compatible with Connect if the client is sending some parameters outside the object without including them in the object as a Connect client might. You would potentially wind up dropping state or nonce without an error. I asked Mike and he was leaning to making it a error to send them as query parameters as that would be a clean change. I think the choice is a bit of a grey area. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: sakim...@gmail.com Sent: March 30, 2017 9:57 PM To: John Bradley; Nat Sakimura Cc: IETF oauth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] FW: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt +1 Sent from my Huawei Mobile -------- Original Message -------- Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] FW: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt From: John Bradley To: Nat Sakimura CC: IETF oauth WG So I think we need to make the must ignore clearer for the additional paramaters on the authorization endpoint. On Mar 30, 2017 17:33, "Nat Sakimura" <n...@sakimura.org> wrote: Not right now. As of this writing, a client can still send duplicate parameters in the query but they get ignored by the servers honoring OAuth JAR. So, it is backwards compatible with OpenID Connect in that sense (OpenID Connect sends duplicate manatory RFC6749 parameters as the query parameters as well just to be compliant to RFC6749). Conversely, servers that do not support OAuth JAR will ignore request_uri etc. On Mar 30, 2017, at 4:47 PM, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote: Is there a clear statement somewhere along the lines of “parameters (other than “request” or “request_uri”) are only allowed to be in the signed object if a signed object is used”? That’s the kind of thing I was looking for and didn’t find. -- Mike From: John Bradley [mailto:ve7...@ve7jtb.com] Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 4:44 PM To: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> Cc: Nat Sakimura <n...@sakimura.org>; IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org> Subject: RE: [OAUTH-WG] FW: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt The intent of the change is to only allow the paramaters to be in the signed object if a signed object is used. This requires State, nonce etc to be in the JWT. Only one place to check will hopefully reduce implimentation errors. This also allows us to remove the caching text as we now have one JWT per request, so caching won't happen. John B. On Mar 30, 2017 4:36 PM, "Mike Jones" <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote: I *believe* the intent is that *all* parameters must be in the request object, but the spec doesn’t actually say that, as far as I can tell. Or maybe the intent is that parameters must not be duplicated between the query parameters and the request object. One or the other of these statements should be explicitly included in the specification. Of course, I could have missed the statement I’m asking for in my review, in which case please let me know what I missed. Thanks, -- Mike From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley Sent: Thursday, March 30, 2017 3:00 PM To: IETF OAUTH <oauth@ietf.org> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] FW: I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt Based on feeback from the IESG we have removed some of the optionality in the draft. It is a shorter read than draft 12. John B. Sent from Mail for Windows 10 From: internet-dra...@ietf.org Sent: March 30, 2017 1:38 PM To: i-d-annou...@ietf.org Cc: oauth@ietf.org Subject: [OAUTH-WG] I-D Action: draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories. This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol of the IETF. Title : The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: JWT Secured Authorization Request (JAR) Authors : Nat Sakimura John Bradley Filename : draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13.txt Pages : 27 Date : 2017-03-30 Abstract: The authorization request in OAuth 2.0 described in RFC 6749 utilizes query parameter serialization, which means that Authorization Request parameters are encoded in the URI of the request and sent through user agents such as web browsers. While it is easy to implement, it means that (a) the communication through the user agents are not integrity protected and thus the parameters can be tainted, and (b) the source of the communication is not authenticated. Because of these weaknesses, several attacks to the protocol have now been put forward. This document introduces the ability to send request parameters in a JSON Web Token (JWT) instead, which allows the request to be signed with JSON Web Signature (JWS) and/or encrypted with JSON Web Encryption (JWE) so that the integrity, source authentication and confidentiality property of the Authorization Request is attained. The request can be sent by value or by reference. The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq/ There are also htmlized versions available at: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13 A diff from the previous version is available at: https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-jwsreq-13 Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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