It would be great to talk to you at the OAuth security worship, Antonio.

Cheers,

-- Mike



From: Antonio Sanso<mailto:asa...@adobe.com>
Sent: Thursday, March 16, 2017 1:31 AM
To: Mike Jones<mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>
Cc: Sergey Beryozkin<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>; 
oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] More Criticism of JOSE



hi Mike

On Mar 15, 2017, at 10:06 PM, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:

> Will you be in Chicago, Antonio?  If so, maybe you can sit down with us and 
> work on advice to implementers.

Unluckily not. FWIW I will be at 
https://zisc.ethz.ch/oauth-security-workshop-2017-cfp/. And I’d be glad to sit 
down with you and try to help if you are around….

regards

antonio


>
>                                Cheers,
>                                -- Mike
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Antonio Sanso [mailto:asa...@adobe.com]
> Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 1:40 PM
> To: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com>
> Cc: Sergey Beryozkin <sberyoz...@gmail.com>; oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] More Criticism of JOSE
>
> hi Mike,
>
> while I am the original author of one of the mentioned article in the blog 
> post 
> (http://blog.intothesymmetry.com/2017/03/critical-vulnerability-in-json-web.html)
>  I do not share entirely the criticism.
> Said that, I must really admit that some of the cryptographic choices made 
> specially in JWE are really questionable.
>
> regards
>
> antonio
>
> On Mar 15, 2017, at 8:50 PM, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:
>
>> The bulk of this seems to be about applications that don't verify that the 
>> crypto algorithms that were used in a JWT are acceptable in the application 
>> context.  While I know that some people would like crypto to be magic pixie 
>> dust that you can sprinkle on an application to get crypto goodness, it will 
>> never be that simple.  Crypto algorithms that are thought to be good today 
>> will be deprecated later.  Apps that keep allowing them to be used will be 
>> vulnerable.  The JOSE specs requiring that applications be aware of the 
>> algorithms used is a good and necessary thing for long-term security - not a 
>> problem with the specs.
>>
>> That said, of course some implementers will get things wrong.  To the extent 
>> that we can help them understand what they actually need to do to use the 
>> specifications securely, we obviously should.  Perhaps we should write an 
>> article for oauth.net talking about some of these issues?  Maybe a few of us 
>> can get together in Chicago and work on that.
>>
>> I'm looking forward to seeing many of you in 1.5 weeks!
>>
>>                               -- Mike
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Sergey
>> Beryozkin
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 15, 2017 8:46 AM
>> To: oauth@ietf.org
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] More Criticism of JOSE
>>
>> and everyone should now start using the most secure alternative
>> proposed in that very light in analysis article :-)
>>
>> Sergey
>> On 15/03/17 15:43, Mike Schwartz wrote:
>>> Sorry to be the bearer of bad news, but here's a negative review of JOSE:
>>>
>>> JOSE (Javascript Object Signing and Encryption) is a Bad Standard
>>> That Everyone Should Avoid
>>>
>>> https://paragonie.com/blog/2017/03/jwt-json-web-tokens-is-bad-standar
>>> d
>>> -that-everyone-should-avoid
>>>
>>>
>>> - Mike
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> OAuth mailing list
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>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>

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