Thanks for the replies.

If there are no formal guidelines from IETF I think we should just proceed
it is a good and informative spec, it was just to me it felt slightly of.

Based on the conversation I have no objections taking this draft to RFC.

//Samuel

On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 12:09 AM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote:

> When I brought RFCs 7591, 7592, and 7662 up through the finalization
> process, I learned that there are two camps out there on normative
> requirements in the security considerations section. Some like them, as
> long as they don’t contradict requirements/advice in previous sections, and
> some don’t like them, preferring all normative material be in the “body” of
> the spec itself. I was given the impression that it was more of a stylistic
> choice than anything, but I can only speak from my personal experience.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Feb 21, 2017, at 3:17 PM, William Denniss <wdenn...@google.com> wrote:
>
> The only real requirement in that section I guess is the use of PKCE
> (8.2).  That requirement could be moved to the body of the doc, while
> keeping the longer discussing around code interception in the security
> considerations.  To me the remaining text are indeed security best
> practices / clarifications.
>
> Other OAuth WG RFCs have requirement level capitalization in the Security
> Section like RFC7591. I always assumed these were best-practice security
> requirements. But if the style is really not to do this, the requirement
> level capitalization could be dropped from that section in the native apps
> BCP.
>
> On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 12:50 AM, Denis <denis.i...@free.fr> wrote:
>
>>
>> I *don't thin**k* it's normal to have normative text in the Security
>> Considerations, hence I support Samuel's position.
>>
>> Let us look at the first MUST from RFC 6749 in the Security
>> Considerations section:
>>
>>    The authorization server *MUST *authenticate the client *whenever 
>> possible*.
>> This sentence is incorrect. The right sentence should be :
>>
>>    The authorization server *should *authenticate the client whenever 
>> possible.
>>
>> RFC 6749 is not an example to follow.
>>
>> Denis
>>
>>
>> I do think it's normal to have normative text in the Security
>> Considerations.  RFC6749 has a lengthy Security Considerations section
>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10> with a lot of normative
>> text.
>>
>> Think of it this way: Sections 4 to 7 describe how to use native app URI
>> schemes to perform OAuth flows from the app to browser and back. If you
>> only read those sections, you could have a functioning (but potentially
>> insecure) OAuth flow in a native app. The security section adds some
>> security requirements and clarifications for implementing Sections 4-7,
>> like using PKCE, and more.
>>
>> Reviewing sub-section by sub-section:
>>
>> 8.1 Definitely belongs here, as the the whole BCP is about native-app URI
>> schemes, whereas doing OAuth in a WebView doesn't need those (as the client
>> can just pluck out the code from any redirect URI)
>> 8.2 Requires that servers who want to follow the native apps BCP support
>> PKCE, and recommends that they reject requests from clients who don't.
>> This *could* be in the main doc, but since PKCE is an existing thing, and
>> is purely additive from a security perspective, I think this reference
>> works fine. Originally I talked about PKCE more in the doc body, but some
>> reviewers thought it was then a little duplicative of the PKCE doc itself.
>> 8.3 This reads like classic security considerations to me, clarifying
>> some details of 7.3
>> 8.4 Part of this reads a little new-ish, regarding distinguishing native
>> clients from web ones. But on review, I think could just be re-worded to
>> reference RFC6749 Section 2.1.
>> 8.5 This one belongs where it is since the body of the BCP is talking
>> about the code flow.
>> 8.6 Totally belongs.
>> 8.7 to 8.11 belong IMO, they are security clarifications of long-standing
>> topics.
>>
>> My methodology when reviewing this was: is the text introducing a new
>> topic directly related to native apps or sections 4-7, or does it discuss
>> an old security topic in the context of native apps, or add security
>> related discussions of the content in 4-7. Of all those, I really only see
>> a bit of new topic related to native apps in 8.4, and in actual fact it
>> that sub-section should probably be reworded since RFC6749 already
>> establishes the public client type, which native apps are and a reference
>> would be more appropriate (which would reduce it to just clarifying an old
>> topic).
>>
>> What do you think of this analysis? Do you have any specific sections or
>> text you feel are better suited in the document body?  I will take an
>> action item to revise section 8.4.
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 20, 2017 at 9:57 PM, Samuel Erdtman <sam...@erdtman.se>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> I just had a question on best practice. In this document a large part of
>>> the normative text is located under Security Considerations.
>>>
>>> I had previously seen Security Considerations as things to think about
>>> when implementing not so much as MUSTs and MUST NOTs.
>>>
>>> I think it is okay to have it this way but it surprised me a bit and
>>> wanted to ask if there is any best practice for the Security Considerations
>>> section saying what type of information it should include.
>>>
>>> Best Regards
>>> Samuel Erdtman
>>>
>>
>>
>>
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