In SPA/REST env session ID is not very useful, so it's *an* auth token or
tokens (not necessary OAuth one) that are stored in a cookie. It's used to get
REST calls authenticated and yes, it usually runs in a multi-domain envs (think
about micro services architecture). It makes me think that the value of
HTTPOnly will continue diminishing, while the value of good cross-domain
policies will increase. Just my opinion coming from my experience. I don't have
big (or small) data available to confirm that.
From: Jim Manico <j...@manicode.com>
To: Oleg Gryb <o...@gryb.info>; Adam Lewis <adam.le...@motorolasolutions.com>
Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 12:51 PM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for implicit grant / token storage
> Since SPA is a new normal now, it becomes extremely difficult to enforce
> HTTPOnly flag, because JS needs access to secrets including those stored in
> cookies. In a browser environment, this is only true when you need to make
> cross domain requests or are using cookie data for something other than
> session state. If your current page origin and the page you are requesting
> are the same, then your cookies can be HTTPOnly without impacting
> functionality. If you need additional cookies for other things that need to
> be accessed via JS, use a separate cookie. So sure, there are a few
> workflows in OAuth where you need to access "cookie data" from JS and
> HTTPOnly is not viable. But there are a few where it is viable. I don't
> think it's as simple as "we need to talk to cookie data via JS all the
> time.". Aloha, Jim
On 9/8/16 8:15 AM, Oleg Gryb wrote:
Jim,
It's outdated a bit. Since SPA is a new normal now, it becomes extremely
difficult to enforce HTTPOnly flag, because JS needs access to secrets
including those stored in cookies. 5-10 years ago I would always enforce
HTTPOnly and now - I can't.
Thanks, Oleg.
From: Jim Manico <j...@manicode.com>
To: Adam Lewis <adam.le...@motorolasolutions.com>
Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Sent: Thursday, September 8, 2016 10:45 AM
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] best practices for implicit grant / token storage
In the web world, cookies for session identifiers are much safer - since we
can use HTTPOnly cookies to protect them from theft via XSS. The same mechanism
is not possible for localStorage. Overall, security folk say •keep sensitive
data out of localStorage• since one XSS and it's stolen. There is also a huge
body of work underway to make secure cookies even more so.
I'm not sure how this translates to native apps.
-- Jim Manico @Manicode
On Sep 8, 2016, at 3:02 AM, Adam Lewis <adam.le...@motorolasolutions.com>
wrote:
Hi,
The WG is currently putting together best practices for native apps. I would
like to better understand the best practices around ua-based-apps, especially
as it relates to token storage. I've read various blog posts about the
preference between storing tokens in cookies vs. Web Storage
(localStorage/sessionStorage). The current set of specs are rather silent on
the matter, as it is more of an implementation issue (but that is where most
mistakes are made).
What is the WG's guidance on this?
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--
Jim Manico
Manicode Security
https://www.manicode.com
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