hi Daniel

On Apr 22, 2016, at 4:20 PM, Daniel Fett <f...@uni-trier.de> wrote:

> Hi all,
> 
> During our formal analysis of OAuth we found an attack that allows
> CSRF. It is similar to the "code" leak described by Homakov in [1] and
> therefore not really surprising. In this attack, the intention for an
> attacker is to steal the "state" value instead of the "code" value.
> 
> Setting:
> 
> In the auth code grant, after authentication to the AS, the user is
> redirected to some page on the Client. If this page leaks the
> referrer, i.e., there is a link to the attacker's website or some
> resource is loaded from the attacker, then the attacker can see not
> only code but also state in the Referer header of the request.
> 
> The fact that code can leak was described in [1]. Since code is
> single-use, it might be already redeemed in most cases when it is sent
> to the attacker.

probably is not redeemed instead, just because the redirect_uri is not the 
correct one.
The mitigation that good implemented AS use (also Github) is to follow section 
4.1.3 the OAuth core specification [RFC6749], in particular:

"ensure that the "redirect_uri" parameter is present if the "redirect_uri" 
parameter was included in the initial authorization request as described in 
Section 4.1.1, and if included ensure that their values are identical."

regards

antonio


> State, however, is not limited to a single use (by 6749 or others) and
> therefore can be used by the attacker to mount a CSRF attack and
> inject his own code into a (new) auth code grant.
> 
> We suggest
> a) making state single use, and
> b) highlighting to developers the importance of non-leaky redirection
> endpoints, and to this end
> c) recommending the use of "referrer policies" [2] to mitigate such attacks.
> 
> Could somebody confirm whether this attack is new?
> 
> Cheers,
> Daniel, Guido, and Ralf
> 
> [1] http://homakov.blogspot.de/2014/02/how-i-hacked-github-again.html
> [2] https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-referrer-policy/
> -- 
> Informationssicherheit und Kryptografie
> Universität Trier - Tel. 0651 201 2847 - H436
> 
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to