Phil
> On Apr 12, 2016, at 03:49, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote: > > We did agree in BA that if the client sends no resource the AS would audience > the AT per configured policy and reply to the client with additional > meta-data about what resources the AT can be used at. We also agreed that was not a remedy for an attack where an attacker simply wants the token to use at the correct site to gain access to the resource. RI is no remedy for misconfiguration esp if it should be optional for the client. > > It should be obvious that this is in no way a breaking change. > > The only clients that need to provide a resource are ones that are asking for > a token for a unknown resource, not something that is supported securely > currently or by Pil’s spec. Or when down scoping a RT with multiple > audiences so that the server can provide the correct token type/ claims / > encryption/ signing. Can we agree that with symmetrically signed AT it is > not a good thing to use the same key for all RS? > > At the moment this can sort of be done with scopes but the client needs much > more documentation about the scopes to understand the mapping between > resource and scope, or possibly discovery of meta-data about the resource, > something also not covered in Phil’s draft. > > We can update the draft as an ID. > > This is essentially the audience part of the POP key distribution with the > addition of Nat’s meta-data for the token endpoint (in the existing JSON > rather than a new header) > > We need to address this. Discovery in general and Phil’s draft specifically > are not a replacement, even if we were to adopt them. > > To Phil’s other question about token binding, no an attacker can’t usefully > MitM a token bound AT. > The private key is controlled by the client and never disclosed. You can > give the token to a MitM attacker but they cannot use it anyplace even with > themselves as they don’t have the private key. That is the security goal of > token binding. > > John B. > >> On Apr 12, 2016, at 4:30 AM, Sergey Beryozkin <sberyoz...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Hi >>> On 11/04/16 23:19, Phil Hunt (IDM) wrote: >>> I am objecting to modifying the protocol in the default case as a >>> majority do not need RI in the case of fixed endpoints. >>> >>> Migration would be challenging because the change is breaking and >>> affects existing clients. >> How does it break the existing clients given this is an optional feature ? >> Can you please describe the situation where the existing clients get broken ? >> >> Brian, would it make sense to update the text to mention that the clients do >> not have to be directly configured and instead it can be set during the >> registration time, so that the property gets seamlessly linked to client >> access tokens, etc, without the client applications having to be set up with >> the resource indicators manually ? >> >> Thanks, Sergey >> >>> Dynamic discovery are up and coming cases and a relatively green field. >>> Dealing with it at configuration/discovery makes broader sense as it has >>> no impact on existing clients. >>> >>> Phil >>> >>> On Apr 11, 2016, at 12:18, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com >>> <mailto:bcampb...@pingidentity.com>> wrote: >>> >>>> I'm not sure where the idea that it's only applicable to special uses >>>> like collaboration services is coming from. The pattern described in >>>> the draft (using a different parameter name but otherwise the same) is >>>> deployed and in-use for normal OAuth cases including and especially >>>> the resource owner centric ones. >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Apr 11, 2016 at 11:33 AM, Phil Hunt (IDM) >>>> <phil.h...@oracle.com <mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I am finding I am not happy with solving the bad resource endpoint >>>> config issue with resource indicator. At best I see this as a >>>> special use draft for things like collab services or things which >>>> aren't resource owner centric. >>>> >>>> Yet resource endpoint config is a concern for all clients that >>>> configure on the fly. Is it reasonable to make resource indicator >>>> mandatory for all clients? Probably not. >>>> >>>> As OAuth depends primarily on TLS, it feels wrong not to have a >>>> solution that confirms the server host names are correct either >>>> via config lookup or some other mechanism. >>>> >>>> Tokbind is also a solution but I suspect it may only appeal to >>>> large scale service providers and may be further off as we wait >>>> for load balancers to support tokbind. Also there are issues with >>>> tokbind on initial user binding where the mitm attack might itself >>>> establish its own token binding. I have to think this through some >>>> to confirm. But the issue of worry is what is happening on >>>> initialization and first use if the hacker has already interceded >>>> a mitm. That would make validation at config time still critical. >>>> >>>> Hopefully somebody can arrive at an alternative for broader oauth >>>> use cases. >>>> >>>> Phil >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> -- >> Sergey Beryozkin >> >> Talend Community Coders >> http://coders.talend.com/ >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
