You mean the string comparison on authority section would allow execution
of some code? Or are you suggesting that not checking the path portion
would allow the attacker to plant something on the other paths on the host?
Yes, the later is possible especially when there are user generated content
on the same host, and if we are worried on it, we would have to do the
discovery.
Nat
2016年1月28日(木) 5:45 Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu>:
> Unless I’m missing something, requiring the authority section to match
> discounts attackers being able to deploy executable code on a path. This
> kind of hole was exploited in a number of Facebook hacks. Yes I’m aware
> that those were dealing with redirect URIs but we’re talking about the same
> kind of sub-component URI matching here, and I can only see it getting us
> into trouble.
>
> — Justin
>
>
> On Jan 27, 2016, at 1:15 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> yeah.
>
> But for Google, Microsoft, etc., every RP can whitelist, cannot they? ;-)
>
> Otherwise, for a code phishing attack, you need to implement discovery of
> some sort. My thinking before reading your email was:
>
> if( authority(authz_ep)==authority(token_ep) ) {
> get_token(token_ep, code, client_credential);
> } else {
> get_token(token_ep_from_discovery(), code, client_credential);
> }
>
> where token_ep_from_discovery() either returns the value of the
> toke_endpoint member from .well-known/openid-configuration OR the value of
> turi parameter in the query.
>
> 2016年1月28日(木) 2:03 Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com>:
>
>> There's at least one smallish deployment that has a different authority
>> for the Authorization Endpoint and the Token Endpoint.
>>
>> from https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration :
>>
>> {
>> "issuer": "https://accounts.google.com";,
>> "authorization_endpoint": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth";,
>> "token_endpoint": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v4/token";,
>> "userinfo_endpoint": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/userinfo";,
>> "revocation_endpoint": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revoke";,
>> "jwks_uri": "https://www.googleapis.com/oauth2/v3/certs";,
>> ...
>> }
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 27, 2016 at 6:30 AM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>>
>>> It think requiring a common authority segment for the authorization
>>> endpoint and the token endpoint might work in common cases, but there are
>>> legitimate cases where the URI of the Authorization endpoint might be a
>>> alias in the case of multi tenants, all using a common token endpoint.
>>>
>>> The larger problem would be the RS, it is not uncommon to have the AS
>>> and RS in different domains, so with bearer tokens unless you make the
>>> same authority restriction for RS then you are not really stoping the
>>> attacker. They can get the AT by impersonating the RS.
>>>
>>> I think trying to enforce a common origin policy over OAuth would be a
>>> bad direction to go.
>>>
>>> I understand that it seems like a easy fix on the surface, and it works
>>> for most of the things people are using OAuth for today, but would be quite
>>> limiting over the long term.
>>>
>>> John B.
>>> > On Jan 27, 2016, at 7:31 AM, sakim...@gmail.com wrote:
>>> >
>>> > Hi Hans,
>>> >
>>> > Sorry, I mixed up the IdP mix-up attack and the code phishing attack.
>>> >
>>> > Mandating the Authorization and Token Endpoint being in the same
>>> > authority would solve the later without changing the wire protocol.
>>> >
>>> > For AS mix-up attack, mandating the client to change the redirection
>>> endpoint
>>> > per AS would solve the problem without change the wire protocol.
>>> >
>>> > If these are not possible, then we would have to look at changing the
>>> > wire protocol. The solution that solves the both cases must
>>> > provide the token endpoint URI authoritatively, which means
>>> > you have to mandate some variation of discovery mandatory.
>>> >
>>> > Nat
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > At 2016-01-27 17:01 Hans Zandbelt wrote:
>>> >> I don't see how that can deal with the specific form of the attack
>>> >> where the Client would have sent the authorization request to the
>>> >> legitimate authorization endpoint of a compromised AS and believes it
>>> >> gets the response from that, where in fact it was redirected away to
>>> >> the good AS.
>>> >> IOW, I don't think this is so much about mixing up endpoints where to
>>> >> send stuff to, but mixing up the entity/endpoint from which the Client
>>> >> believes the response was received. That may just be terminology
>>> >> though.
>>> >> Bottom line as far as I see is that a wire protocol element in the
>>> >> response is needed to tell the Client who issued it, regardless of how
>>> >> the Client deals with configuration of the AS information.
>>> >> Hans.
>>> >> On 1/27/16 1:31 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
>>> >>> So, is there a lot of cases that the authority section of the Good
>>> AS's
>>> >>> Authorization Endpoint and the Token Endpoints are different?
>>> >>> If not, then requiring that they are the same seems to virtually
>>> remove
>>> >>> the attack surface for the mix-up related attacks. It does not
>>> introduce
>>> >>> new parameter nor discovery. If it can be done, it probably is not
>>> worth
>>> >>> adding a new wire protocol element to mitigate the mix-up variants.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > _______________________________________________
>>> > OAuth mailing list
>>> > OAuth@ietf.org
>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>
>>>
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>
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