As fat as I'm concerned, grant==authorisation (English is not my native
language so forgive me if I'm misusing some words).
When the user clicks the authorize button on the consent screen, we save
the scopes in the database. Tokens are independent from that (except for
the business rules that we don't issue a token for a scope that hasn't
been authorized and will revoke tokens for scopes that the user later
"unauthorizes"), each token has its list of scopes maintained
independently from the list of authorized scopes.
Le mer. 27 janv. 2016 12:17, Sergey Beryozkin <sberyoz...@gmail.com
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>> a écrit :
Hi,
Many thanks to all who provided the feedback.
As far as the existing token update is concerned I was thinking
about it
in the context of the incremental authorization which we haven't
implemented yet so we'll need to review how to handle it later on.
Right now we are only prototyping the code for not challenging
the user
with a consent screen if the requested scopes have already been
approved
(per a given user + client id combination, and which is a base for
supporting the incremental auth at a next step).
I'm a bit confused about the use of a 'grant' term in your replies.
So consider a confidential client redirecting the user and
requesting
some scope, as part of the authorization code flow. The user
authorizes
the client and the client gets a code *grant* which is according
to the
spec can live for up to *10 min*. The client exchanges this grant
for a
token with the token preserving the fact the user has authorized
a given
scope for this client. I guess this is all quite common.
Note the code 'grant' has already gone by now, because it was
already
used once, withing a 10 mins period, which is another spec
requirement.
That is why I'm referring to the existing access token record
which can
be used for keeping the track of the scopes approved by a given
user for
a given client. This token can be refreshed if needed.
When the user's session with a confidential client's web app has
expired, the user is redirected to authenticate, with some scopes
requested. At this point the record which keeps the approved
scopes for
a given user/client is an existing access/refresh token.
This is why I'm confused about the use of the 'grant' term in your
replies. I guess this can be a 'grant' record for keeping the
list of
the approved scopes/etc not related to a record representing a
transient
authorization code record. But as I said, using the live
access/refresh
token info seems reasonable, sorry, may be it is becoming too
implementation specific...
Cheers, Sergey
On 26/01/16 23:03, Justin Richer wrote:
> In MITREid Connect we track grants per client_id per user, and we
have a
> separate database object for storing them. I wouldn’t recommend
simply
> updating an access token that’s already in the wild with more
power —
> that just sounds wrong.
>
> — Justin
>
>> On Jan 26, 2016, at 1:57 PM, Thomas Broyer <t.bro...@gmail.com
<mailto:t.bro...@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:t.bro...@gmail.com <mailto:t.bro...@gmail.com>>> wrote:
>>
>> Fwiw, at Ozwillo, we track grants per user per client_id (we
don't
>> support native apps; only web flows for now), and we don't do
>> "incremental grants" like Google: if you request scope B and the
user
>> had only granted scope A, you'll get a token for scope B only.
This is
>> partly because our tokens are not for our own APIs only,
contrary to
>> Google, so we want to allow clients to get tokens with narrow
scopes
>> so they could have one token per third-party API and prevent
rogue
>> resources from trying to use received tokens at other APIs.
>>
>> UI-wise, we tell the user what he already granted to the
client, and
>> even let him grant scopes that the client has pre-registered as
>> "possibly needed at some time" (through a custom provisioning
>> protocol), but the issued token is always for the exact
scopes that
>> the client requested in this specific request.
>> And if all requested scopes have already been granted, then
we do a
>> transparent redirect without showing anything to the user
(which is
>> what most other implementations do too)
>>
>> Le mar. 26 janv. 2016 19:04, Sergey Beryozkin
<sberyoz...@gmail.com <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>>> a
écrit :
>>
>> Hi
>>
>> I'm not sure if the next question is off topic or too low
level,
>> hopefully not,
>>
>> When the repeated authorization is skipped or only new
scopes are
>> requested to be authorized as per the incremented auth
approach, is it
>> reasonable to assume that the record that is used to track
it all is
>> actually the existing access token or is totally OIDC
implementation
>> specific ?
>> I think using the existing token as a record is reasonable
because
>> it is
>> time scoped and if we do not use the access token for
keeping the
>> track
>> of the multiple approvals, etc, then one need to introduce
one more
>> record mirroring to some extent the access token...
>>
>> For example, the user session may have expired but the
access
>> token that
>> was issued to a client web app on behalf of this user is
still active,
>> so when the user returns and signs in again, and for
example, approves
>> few more scopes, then the existing access token (the record)
gets
>> updated, instead of a new token being created.
>>
>> If it is reasonable then does it mean the sticky or
incremental
>> authorization works as long as the access token is available
>> (refreshable) ?
>>
>> Sergey
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 19/01/16 09:59, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
>> > Hi William
>> >
>> > Thanks for the advice. FYI we are also on the way to
supporting the
>> > incremental authorization of scopes - thanks for
highlighting the
>> > importance of this process on this list...
>> >
>> > Cheers, Sergey
>> > On 19/01/16 03:10, William Denniss wrote:
>> >> Agree with Justin, this is pretty common. We support
it for
>> re-auth as
>> >> well as incremental auth (where the user has already
approved
>> scope "a"
>> >> and is presented with a request for scopes "a b", they
will
>> only need to
>> >> approve scope "b"). In fact if you don't do this, then
>> incremental auth
>> >> isn't really viable.
>> >>
>> >> Regarding security: don't do this for non-confidential
clients
>> where you
>> >> can't verify the identity of the app by the redirect
(e.g. a
>> localhost
>> >> redirect to an installed app).
>> >>
>> >> On Mon, Jan 18, 2016 at 4:44 AM, Sergey Beryozkin
>> <sberyoz...@gmail.com <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>>
>> >> <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com> <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>>>> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Hi Justin, thanks for the advice,
>> >>
>> >> Cheers, Sergey
>> >>
>> >> On 18/01/16 11:47, Justin Richer wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Yes, this is common practice. Give the user the
option to
>> >> remember the
>> >> decision. This is known as "trust on first
use", or
>> tofu. Our
>> >> server,
>> >> MITREid Connect, implements this as do many
others.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> -- Justin
>> >>
>> >> / Sent from my phone /
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> -------- Original message --------
>> >> From: Sergey Beryozkin <sberyoz...@gmail.com
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>>
>> >> <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>
>> <mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com
<mailto:sberyoz...@gmail.com>>>>
>> >> Date: 1/18/2016 5:59 AM (GMT-05:00)
>> >> To: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
<mailto:oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>
>> <mailto:oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
<mailto:oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>>>
>> >> Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Can the repeated
authorization of
>> scopes be
>> >> avoided ?
>> >>
>> >> Hi All
>> >>
>> >> The question relates to the process of showing
the
>> authorization
>> >> code/implicit flow consent screen to a user.
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> I'm discussing with my colleagues the
possibility of
>> avoiding
>> >> asking the
>> >> same user whose session has expired and who is
>> re-authenticating
>> >> with AS
>> >> which scopes should be approved.
>> >>
>> >> For example, suppose the OAuth2 client redirects
a user
>> with the
>> >> requested scope 'a'. The user signs in to AS and
is shown a
>> >> consent
>> >> screen asking to approve the 'a' scope. The user
>> approves 'a'
>> >> and the
>> >> flow continues.
>> >>
>> >> Some time later, when the user's session has
expired,
>> the user is
>> >> redirected to AS with the same 'a' scope.
>> >>
>> >> Would it be a good idea, at this point, not to
show the
>> user the
>> >> consent
>> >> screen asking to approve the 'a' scope again ?
For
>> example, AS
>> >> can
>> >> persist the fact that a given user has already
approved
>> 'a' for
>> >> a given
>> >> client earlier, so when the user
re-authenticates, AS
>> will use
>> >> this info
>> >> and will avoid showing the consent screen.
>> >>
>> >> That seems to make sense, but I'm wondering, can
there
>> be some
>> >> security
>> >> implications associated with it, any
>> recommendations/advices
>> >> will be welcome
>> >>
>> >> Sergey
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
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<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>>
<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>> <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>>>
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> _______________________________________________
>> >> OAuth mailing list
>> >> OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>>
<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>
>> <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org>>>
>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> >>
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>>
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>
--
Sergey Beryozkin
Talend Community Coders
http://coders.talend.com/
