Convergence is exactly what I’m arguing for, though. These things ought to work 
together.

 — Justin

> On Jan 21, 2016, at 2:55 AM, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:
> 
> My memory of the discussions of the oauth-meta draft in Yokohama were that 
> many people felt that it was unnecessarily dynamically duplicating a lot of 
> information that the client already had.  Most of us that were aware of the 
> attacks then were in favor of a more targeted, minimal approach.  You were 
> listened to in Yokohama, but that didn’t necessarily mean that people agreed 
> with the approach.  Participants were already aware of the oauth-meta 
> proposal in Darmstadt but no one spoke up in favor of it that I can recall.  
> Rather, I think people were thinking that “less is more”.
>  
> There have also been discussions in the last day about how dynamically 
> returning a resource URL, which oauth-meta does, is both unnecessary (since 
> the client initiated the resource authorization already knowing what resource 
> it wants to access) and often problematic, since many authorization servers 
> can authorize access to multiple resources.  If anything, the client should 
> be telling the authorization server what resource it wants to access – not 
> the other way around.
>  
> I’m not saying that there aren’t some good ideas in the oauth-meta draft – 
> I’m sure there are, just as there are in the approach designed by the 
> participants in Darmstadt.  While I volunteered to write the first draft of 
> the mix-up-mitigation approach, it really reflects something a lot of people 
> have already bought into – as evidenced in the passion in the high-volume 
> “Mix-Up About The Mix-Up Mitigation” thread, and not just my personal project.
>  
> If you think there are things missing or wrong in the mix-up-mitigation 
> draft, please say what they are.  That will help us quickly converge on a 
> solution that will work for everyone.
>  
>                                                           Sincerely,
>                                                           -- Mike
>   <>
> From: Nat Sakimura [mailto:sakim...@gmail.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 2016 11:17 PM
> To: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com>; William Denniss 
> <wdenn...@google.com>; Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption
>  
> Hi Mike. 
>  
> Conversely, I would like to ask why this approach does not work for Mix-up 
> attack. As Nov stated, we in fact have discussed the approach in quite a 
> length back in Yokohama. I really would like to know why it does not work. 
>  
> Besides, for oauth-meta approach, mix-up attack is only one of the thing it 
> solves. 
>  
> Nat Sakimura
>  
> 2016年1月21日(木) 16:02 Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com 
> <mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>>:
> Not to be negative, but I disagree with adopting draft-sakimura-oauth-meta.  
> We should define and promote one mitigation approach to the mix-up attacks.  
> Having two would confuse implementers and cause compatibility problems – 
> reducing overall security.
>  
> The approach defined in draft-jones-oauth-mix-up-mitigation was created in 
> collaboration with the security researchers who identified the problems in 
> the first place, was vigorously discussed in the security meeting Hannes and 
> Torsten held in Darmstadt, and has been since refined based on substantial 
> input from the working group.  And at least three implementers have already 
> stated that they’ve implemented it.  I’m not saying that it’s, but if there 
> are things missing or things that need to be improved in our approach, we 
> should do it there, rather introducing a competing approach.
>  
> Also, standard OAuth deployments register the client and then use the 
> information gathered at registration time for subsequent protocol 
> interactions.  They do not need all the configuration information for the 
> authorization server to be retransmitted at runtime.  The oauth-meta draft 
> goes too far in that direction, at least as I see it.  Returning things two 
> ways creates its own problems, as discussed in the Duplicate Information 
> Attacks security considerations section (7.2) of the mix-up-mitigation draft.
>  
> I’ll note that the mix-up-mitigation approach is compatible with existing 
> practice in both static and dynamic metadata discovery.  Replying to Justin’s 
> comment that “It's the pre-configured discovery document that's at the root 
> of the mix-up attack in the first place” – this is not the case.  The attacks 
> can be performed without either discovery or dynamic registration.
>  
> I would be interested in hearing a technical discussion on whether there are 
> aspects of the oauth-meta approach that mitigate aspects of the attacks that 
> the mix-up-mitigation approach does not.  That could help inform whether 
> there are additional things we should add to or change in the mix-up draft.
>  
>                                                           -- Mike
>   <>
> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org <mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] 
> On Behalf Of William Denniss
> Sent: Wednesday, January 20, 2016 10:37 PM
> To: Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu <mailto:jric...@mit.edu>>
> Cc: oauth@ietf.org <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Call for Adoption
>  
> +1 to adopt this, and I agree with Justin's comments.
>  
> On Wed, Jan 20, 2016 at 9:53 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu 
> <mailto:jric...@mit.edu>> wrote:
> +1
> 
> Inline discovery and pre-configured discovery (ie, .well-known) should at the 
> very least be compatible and developed together. It's the pre-configured 
> discovery document that's at the root of the mix-up attack in the first place.
> 
>  -- Justin
>  
> 
> On 1/19/2016 10:30 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
> Just to give more context, at IETF 94, I have done a presentation on 
> discovery. 
>  
> According to the minutes, 
>  
>     (f) Discovery (Nat)
>           
>              Nat explains his document as an example of the work that has to 
> be done
>              in the area of discovery, which is a topic that has been 
> identified
>              as necessary for interoperability since many years but so far 
> there
>              was not time to work on it. Mike, John and Nat are working on a 
> new
>              document that describes additional discovery-relevant components.
>           
>              Poll: 19 for / zero against / 4 persons need more information.
>  
> The document discussed there was 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-05 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-05>. This is a simple 
> (only 1-page!) but a very powerful document that nudges towards HATEOAS which 
> is at the core of RESTful-ness. It also mitigates the Mix-up attack without 
> introducing the concept of issuer which is not in RFC6749. It is also good 
> for selecting different endpoints depending on the user authentication and 
> authorization results and more privacy sensitive than pre-announced Discovery 
> document. It also allows you to find to which protected resource endpoint you 
> can use the access token against. 
>  
> In the last sentence of the minutes, it talks about "a new document that 
> describes additional discovery-relevant components". This is 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-oauth-discovery-00 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jones-oauth-discovery-00>.  It went for 
> the call for adoption. However, it is only a half of the story. I believe 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-05 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-05> that was discussed 
> at IETF 94 and had support there should be adopted as well. 
>  
> Nat Sakimura
>  
>  
>  
>  
> 2016年1月20日(水) 12:05 Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com 
> <mailto:sakim...@gmail.com>>:
> Thanks Hannes. 
>  
> I did not find https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-05 
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sakimura-oauth-meta-05>, which was 
> discussed in Yokohama, and was largely in agreement if my recollection is 
> correct. Why is it not in the call for adoption? 
>  
>  
>  
> 2016年1月19日(火) 20:39 Hannes Tschofenig <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net 
> <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>>:
> Hi all,
> 
> we have submitted our new charter to the IESG (see
> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg15379.html 
> <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/oauth/current/msg15379.html>) and
> since some IESG members like to see an updated list of milestones as
> well. For this reason, based on a suggestion from Barry, we are also
> starting a call for adoption concurrently with the review of the charter
> text by the IESG.
> 
> We will post separate mails on the individual documents. Your feedback
> is important! Please take the time to look at the documents and provide
> your feedback.
> 
> Ciao
> Hannes & Derek
> 
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