Looks good. (Sorry I missed this in my earlier message). I will add to Monday's revision.
Phil > On Nov 20, 2015, at 08:36, Kathleen Moriarty > <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi Phil, > > Thanks for your response on these questions, a few more comments > in-line and we should be able to wrap this up and move it to the next > phase quickly. > >> On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 4:03 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote: >> Comments inline. >> >> Phil >> >> @independentid >> www.independentid.com >> phil.h...@oracle.com >> >>> On Nov 16, 2015, at 12:37 PM, Kathleen Moriarty >>> <kathleen.moriarty.i...@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>> Hello, >>> >>> I reviewed draft-ietf-oauth-pop-architecture and have a few questions. >>> >>> 1. Section 6, Threat Mitigation: >>> >>> Last sentence of first paragraph, "To >>> simplify the subsequent description we assume that the token itself >>> is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot >>> be modified." >>> >>> Since bearer tokens are not signed by default, is this proposing a >>> change? If so, where will that change occur? To state that "it is >>> assumed" without it being required anywhere is not a good assumption. >>> I'd still see this as a risk or security consideration. When OAuth is >>> re-used by other protocols, I am seeing that re-use leave off basic >>> protections that should be assumed like TLS, let alone digital >>> signatures. If this is required in the defined architecture (Section >>> 7 - it does show this, but there are no MUSTs that I can find), just >>> state that and refer to the requirement. >> >> [PH] I think the change is the point of the POP specifications. We are >> talking about a new class of tokens that are specifically not Bearer tokens >> thus the threat mitigation states that POP tokens are assumed to be >> digitally signed. > > Sure, but that is not spelled out in the requirements section and > should be. I think the issue may be that the requirements section > just says that the requirements are from RFC4962 and put into OAuth > terms. There isn't any text or list that says the following > requirements are added for this architecture and I would expect to see > that. Can you add that so you will be able to make such assumptions > with this architecture going forward and subsequent draft authors > would have clear guidance? > >> >> Was that not clear from the introduction? > > There should be something in the requirements section. The phrasing > of this particular sentence could be changed as follows (in addition > to adding a requirement): > > "To > simplify the subsequent description we assume in the POP > architecture that the token itself > is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot > be modified." > > Or something like: > "To > simplify the subsequent description we assume in this > architecture that the token itself > is digitally signed by the authorization server and therefore cannot > be modified." > > The second choice is added only because you don't seem to use the term > POP architecture in the draft, but it would be good to make it clear > that this draft adds this assumption, it is something new. > > >>> >>> 2. Section 6, Threat Mitigation >>> >>> Third paragraph, "As an example, TLS with a ciphersuite >>> that offers confidentiality protection has to be applied (which is >>> currently true for all ciphersuites, except for one). >>> >>> Please list a reference so the reader knows which ciphersuites are >>> acceptable from the recommended ones in RFC7525. I don't recall there >>> being any MTI ciphersuites for OAuth (I'm pretty sure there aren't and >>> that we've discussed that already with previous drafts, so this should >>> be spelled out more). >> [PH] I think this can be simplified a bit. I think this was referring to a >> “NULL” ciphersuite which is what 7525 says should not be done. We should >> also point to 7525. > > That would take care of it and would be a minor and clear change. Thank you! > >>> >>> 3. (Nit) Section 6.2, add a comma to improve readability >>> From: "Instead of providing confidentiality protection the authorization >>> server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected >>> token with the following semantic:" >>> To: "Instead of providing confidentiality protection, the authorization >>> server could also put the identifier of the client into the protected >>> token with the following semantic:” >> [PH] Will add to the next draft pending your comments on the above items. > > Thank you! > Kathleen > >> >>> Thank you all for your work on this draft! >>> -- >>> >>> Best regards, >>> Kathleen >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > -- > > Best regards, > Kathleen _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
