John, The updates were included in the version I approved for posting that also addressed Barry's discuss points, correct?
Are we good with the current version to move forward: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-spop/ Thank you, Kathleen On Thu, Jul 9, 2015 at 2:46 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote: > I have made some edits to make it consistent. They are checked into the > butbucket repo nat and I use, but we can’t update the official draft during > the freeze before the IETF meeting. > > https://bitbucket.org/Nat/oauth-spop > > On Jul 9, 2015, at 3:19 PM, Brian Campbell <bcampb...@pingidentity.com> > wrote: > > I agree with William that it's a little confusing. I get that there's a > desire to discourage using "plain" but perhaps the language (especially the > MUST NOT in 7.2) should be lightened up just a bit? > > On Wed, Jul 8, 2015 at 8:22 PM, William Denniss <wdenn...@google.com> > wrote: > >> Following up the discussion on today's NAPPS call, I understand why plain >> is not presented as the recommended approach in the spec (though it still >> has some value over not doing PKCE at all, in that it mitigates against the >> current known attack where a rogue app registers the same custom URI scheme >> as another), but I feel that after all the back and forth the picture is a >> little confusing. >> >> In particular, 4.2 and 4.4.1 include some examples where plain is >> supported: >> >> 4.2 >>> Clients SHOULD use the S256 transformation. The plain transformation is >>> for compatibility with existing deployments and for constrained >>> environments that can't use the S256 transformation. >>> >> >> >> 4.4.1. >>> If the client is capable of using "S256", it MUST use "S256", as "S256" >>> is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server. Clients are permitted to use >>> "plain" only if they cannot support "S256" for some technical reason and >>> knows that the server supports "plain". >> >> >> But then 7.2 is very vocal that it MUST NOT be used for new >> implementations: >> >> 7.2 >>> Because of this, "plain" SHOULD NOT be used, and exists only >>> for compatibility with deployed implementations where the request path >>> is already protected. The "plain" method MUST NOT be used in >>> new implementations. >> >> >> What if those new implementations are constrained, as indicated in 4.2 >> and 4.4.1? >> >> >> Also, while S256 is clearly indicated as MTI, little is said about >> "plain", although it's alluded to that it's not MTI in 4.4.1 ("and knows >> that the server supports "plain""). >> >> Should we be more explicit upfront that "plain" is optional for servers >> to support, if that's the intention? >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 10:51 PM, William Denniss <wdenn...@google.com> >> wrote: >> >>> t_m works for me, I just think we should have some indication that it's >>> the name of the transform. Will you also update where it is referenced in >>> the description below Figure 2? >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 6:28 PM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Thanks, I fixed my finger dyslexia for the next draft. >>>> >>>> I changed it to t_m rather than “t” I think that is clearer. If I >>>> were to do it the other way XML2RFC would have double quotes in the text >>>> version. >>>> >>>> John B. >>>> >>>> On Jul 7, 2015, at 9:38 PM, William Denniss <wdenn...@google.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> In version 14, there's a typo on this line ("deso") in Section 7.2: >>>> >>>> `"plain" method deso not protect` >>>> >>>> Also, in the 1.1 Protocol Flow diagram, regarding the text: >>>> >>>> `+ t(code_verifier), t` >>>> >>>> I wonder if it makes more sense to represent as `+ t(code_verifier), >>>> "t"` (note the quotes on the second 't') given that it's a string >>>> representation of the method that's being sent? >>>> >>>> >>>> On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 4:05 PM, <internet-dra...@ietf.org> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts >>>>> directories. >>>>> This draft is a work item of the Web Authorization Protocol Working >>>>> Group of the IETF. >>>>> >>>>> Title : Proof Key for Code Exchange by OAuth Public >>>>> Clients >>>>> Authors : Nat Sakimura >>>>> John Bradley >>>>> Naveen Agarwal >>>>> Filename : draft-ietf-oauth-spop-14.txt >>>>> Pages : 20 >>>>> Date : 2015-07-06 >>>>> >>>>> Abstract: >>>>> OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are >>>>> susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. This >>>>> specification describes the attack as well as a technique to >>>>> mitigate >>>>> against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange >>>>> (PKCE, pronounced "pixy"). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is: >>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-spop/ >>>>> >>>>> There's also a htmlized version available at: >>>>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-spop-14 >>>>> >>>>> A diff from the previous version is available at: >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-spop-14 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of >>>>> submission >>>>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. >>>>> >>>>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at: >>>>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/ >>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> OAuth mailing list >>>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > -- Best regards, Kathleen
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