Hi Justin,

Thanks for addressing my comments. One more note below.

On Jun 22, 2015, at 5:51 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote:

> Alissa,
> 
> I’ve uploaded a new draft that should address your comments below:
> 
> Draft: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-10
> 
> Diff: 
> https://tools.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-10.txt
> 
> Please let me know if you have any further questions,
>  — Justin
> 
>> On Jun 11, 2015, at 5:00 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mit.edu> wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Alissa, thanks for your review. Responses are inline.
>> 
>>> On Jun 8, 2015, at 9:40 AM, Alissa Cooper <ali...@cooperw.in> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-oauth-introspection-09: Discuss
>>> 
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
>>> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-introspection/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> DISCUSS:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> = Section 2.1 =
>>> "The endpoint MAY allow other parameters to provide further context to
>>>  the query.  For instance, an authorization service may need to know
>>>  the IP address of the client accessing the protected resource in
>>>  order to determine the appropriateness of the token being presented."
>>> 
>>> How does the protected resource know whether it needs to include such
>>> additional parameters or not?
>>> What is meant by the "appropriateness" of
>>> the token? 
>>> 
>>> In general if we're talking about a piece of data that could be sensitive
>>> like client IP address, it would be better for there to be specific
>>> guidelines to direct protected resources as to when this information
>>> needs to be sent. I note that Section 5 basically says such
>>> considerations are out of scope, but if this specific example is to be
>>> provided here then they seem in scope to me.
>> 
>> We are trying to leave the door open to extensions and adaptations of this 
>> protocol, specifically around the protected resource passing along 
>> information about the client’s request. The AS might be able to help the RS 
>> detect funny business on the client’s behalf (i.e., whether it’s appropriate 
>> for the client to presenting the token in this context) if it has that 
>> information. 
>> 
>> The example isn’t supposed to be normative or pull extra considerations into 
>> scope of this protocol but instead to point out where it could go.


I think there are two more changes that could make this crystal clear. 

In 2.1:
s/The definition of any other parameters/The definition of this or any other 
parameters/

In 5:
s/such information could have additional privacy considerations/such 
information could have additional privacy considerations that extension 
specifications should detail./

Thanks,
Alissa

>> 
>> Do you have a suggestion for rewording this? Perhaps it would be best to 
>> move all of this language to the security considerations section, as it’s 
>> more guidance for what extensions to this spec would need to think about as 
>> opposed to what pure implementations of this spec would need.
>> 
>>> 
>>> = Section 5 =
>>> "One way to limit disclosure is to require
>>>  authorization to call the introspection endpoint and to limit calls
>>>  to only registered and trusted protected resource servers."
>>> 
>>> I thought Section 2.1 made authorization to call the introspection
>>> endpoint mandatory. This makes it sound like it's optional. Which is it?
>> 
>> Thanks for this catch. Authorization used to be optional, and it looks like 
>> we missed updating this text. I’ll fix that in the next revision.
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> = Section 1.1 =
>>> There is no reference to RFC2119 here, which may be okay but most
>>> documents include it if they use normative language (I think).
>>> 
>> 
>> Not sure how that happened, this should have been included by the xml2rfc 
>> tooling, I’ll look into it.
>> 
>>> = Section 2 =
>>> "The
>>>  definition of an active token is up to the authorization server, but
>>>  this is commonly a token that has been issued by this authorization
>>>  server, is not expired, has not been revoked, and is within the
>>>  purview of the protected resource making the introspection call."
>>> 
>>> Is "within the purview" a term of art for OAuth 2.0? Is there a more
>>> specific way to describe what is meant here? Also, I note that in the
>>> description of the "active" member in Section 2.2, this criterion is not
>>> listed. It seems like these should be aligned.
>> 
>> It is not a term of art in OAuth, and I can change that to “is able to be 
>> used at the protected resource” if that’s clearer. I will also add that to 
>> the list of checks about the active value, thanks.
>> 
>>> 
>>> = Section 2.2 =
>>> "Note that in order to avoid disclosing too much of the
>>>  authorization server's state to a third party, the authorization
>>>  server SHOULD NOT include any additional information about an
>>>  inactive token, including why the token is inactive."
>>> 
>>> Seems like this should be a MUST NOT unless there's some reason for
>>> providing anything other than active set to false. Same comment applies
>>> in Section 4.
>> 
>> That’s why it’s SHOULD — which translates, roughly, to “do it this way 
>> unless you’ve got a really, really good reason not to”.
>> 
>>> 
>>> = Section 2.3 =
>>> It seems like there is another error condition and I'm wondering if its
>>> handling needs to be specified. Per my question in Section 2.1, if it's
>>> possible that the request is properly formed but is missing some
>>> additional information that the authorization server needs to evaluate
>>> it, should there be an error condition specified for that case?
>>> 
>> 
>> Not by this specification, since there isn’t a mechanism for the protected 
>> resource to figure out automatically what to do next. If there’s a future 
>> extension specifying this extra information, it can define its own value.
>> 
>> — Justin
>> 
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> OAuth mailing list
>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>> 
> 

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to