Hi John
Many thanks for the clarifications. FYI, I posted some comments re the
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution to a
dedicated thread.
I just wonder is it OK to distinguish between bearer and JWT tokens in
the spec texts referring to the client processing the access token
responses. As far as the access tokens are concerned JWT token is just a
data container which can be useful to AS/RS for the purpose of
representing the relevant info, I'm curious if the client needs to know
anything about the access_token format/representations at all.
I'm also curious about the option where the whole token responses are
JWE encrypted even if TLS is used, with the assymetric key cases; thus
allowing for the key being always in a plain base64 URL encoded form (in
the case of the key distributions) but also in other cases I guess...We
will offer this option for our users as an extension but I wonder if
someone else here would find it useful
Cheers, Sergey
On 07/11/14 14:15, John Bradley wrote:
You don't need to use JWT access tokens, you could use a opaque token and
introspect it. However JWT access tokens are likely the simplest answer for
getting the clients proof key to the RS.
in http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution you can
register a secret for the client and encrypt a symmetric key to it, if you want
to use symmetric proofs for the RS.
For performance using symmetric proofs to the RS is not a bad option.
If the client is a server and has appropriate hardware protection for
asymmetric keys then using a asymmetric key protected by a HSM is going to be
the most secure.
For native public client, they can start the flow with SPOP and when they
exchange code and the code verifier get a symmetric proof key for the AT.
SPOP and Proof of possession for AT are complimentary and used to protect
different parts of the flow.
The c_hash and at_hash that we added to the id_token in Connect allow a client
to determine if a token delivered in the front channel has been tampered with
by the user agent.
(Some AS return at_hash in id_tokens returned from the token endpoint for
interoperability, but hat is not required)
John B
On Nov 7, 2014, at 8:12 AM, Sergey Beryozkin <sberyoz...@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi
On 06/11/14 18:51, Bill Mills wrote:
So you're wanting end to end security not relying on TLS?
I was not really thinking about HTTPS vs HTTP in this case. I'm kind of in the
process of appreciating what JWE/JWS can do and I can't help trying to consider
it applying at the every possible opportunity :-)
Have you seen the new draft on protecting codes from interception?
Currently called SPOP but needs a different name.
Do you mean this one:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-spop-02
?
Yes I did - it's a different mechanism though, I guess it is of most help to
the pubic clients, though we do not distinguish in our code, a confidential
client can use the SPOP mechanism too.
I think the wrapping idea is probably what
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bradley-oauth-pop-key-distribution-01#ref-10
talks about with respect to distributing a key using a JWE option.
That actually looks interesting; I haven't analyzed it much yet but apparently
it is tied to the access token being necessarily in a JWT format, may be I did
not get it right yet.
I guess it just can be interesting even in the TLS case. I believe people do
not mind doing the extra protection even in the TLS cases.
Or take the implicit grant; if the wrapped access token reaches a client which
is aware of WebCrypto API then it is probably making this grant much more
secure...
Sergey
On Thursday, November 6, 2014 4:12 AM, Sergey Beryozkin
<sberyoz...@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi
Does it make sense to consider supporting an access token or code
wrapping as part of the standard OAuth2 responses ?
For example, if a client has registered its public key with AS then say
the access token response would contain the regular
{"access_token":"1234345"}
except that "1234345" would actually be a JWE RSA-OAEP wrapped opaque
token with a client's public key being used. Or a direct key encrypted
token if the client and the server only share the client secret
allocated to the client during the registration.
The net result is that only the registered confidential client would be
able to extract the actual opaque access token. The response would
actually be
{"access_token":"1234345", wrapped:true}.
I definitely plan to use this approach as a simple mechanism for making
a safer distribution of mac keys as part of access token responses; but
IMHO it can be handy for minimizing the possibility of the
access/refresh tokens or codes being intercepted...
Sergey
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