I'm ok with that text, and actually thought we had something along those lines 
already.

--Justin

/sent from my phone/

On Jul 22, 2014 3:27 PM, tors...@lodderstedt.net wrote:
>
> Hi all,
>
> I don't think this parameter adds any security (as it is self declarded by 
> the caller). I think the constraints on redirect_uris can be specified 
> without the need for another registration parameter. As far as I understand, 
> they merely depend on the grant type. So we could some text to the 
> redirect_uri parameter definition. Something along the following lines:
>
> "All redirect URIs registered for a particular client MUST either (1) use the 
> HTTPS scheme or (2) the HTTP scheme with localhost as the hostname or custom 
> schemes. Additionally, clients using the implict grant type MUST only 
> register URLs using the https scheme as redirect_uris; they MUST NOT use 
> localhost as the hostname."  
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 08.07.2014 21:35, schrieb Richer, Justin P.:
>>
>> Right, that's how it's used in Connect, which defines only redirect-based 
>> flows. However, the OAuth version needs to be more general purpose. 
>>  
>> It seems like this parameter really does need more discussion in the group 
>> before it should be added to the spec, and therefore I don't think it's 
>> appropriate to add it at this stage (post-WGLC).
>>  
>>  -- Justin
>>
>> On Jul 8, 2014, at 8:54 PM, Nat Sakimura <sakim...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> If I understand correctly, this parameter is used to appropriately 
>>> constrain the schema of the Redirect URIs at the time of the registration 
>>> and is not about fulfilling the Client Type registration requirement in 
>>> section 2.1. So, making go or no-go decision based on the discussion around 
>>> section 2.1 probably would not be the way to go. The discussion should 
>>> happen around the needs on constraining the schema depending on the kind of 
>>> client. 
>>>  
>>> Apparently, Connect WG perceived that it is a big enough risk that they 
>>> need to put a plug on based on the risk evaluation as an identity 
>>> federation protocol. OAuth has different risk profile so it could decide 
>>> otherwise, but my gut feeling is that unless there is a good reason not to 
>>> have it, we may as well keep it. 
>>>  
>>> Nat
>>>
>>>
>>> 2014-07-09 7:54 GMT+09:00 Richer, Justin P. <jric...@mitre.org>:
>>>>
>>>> This value was introduced in -18, and it's a direct port from OpenID 
>>>> Connect. It was never in the OAuth Dynamic Registration spec, and though 
>>>> it has been in the OpenID Connect Dynamic Registration spec for a very 
>>>> long time, I think it was a mistake to add it in for several reasons: 
>>>>  
>>>> First, the semantics around its values and use are not clearly defined, 
>>>> for the reasons . I don't see any particular harm in keeping it, but I 
>>>> don't really see what value it adds for clients or server developers. We 
>>>> are in a world where there are OAuth clients that are much more than just 
>>>> "native" or "web".
>>>>  
>>>> Second, RFC6749 defines "Client Type" in § 2.1 which defines two values: 
>>>> "confidential" and "public", neither of which maps very cleanly to 
>>>> "native" or "web" as stated in -18. This is especially true when you've 
>>>> got dynamic registration that can make native clients confidential with 
>>>> relative ease. We actually take care of registering the "client type" 
>>>> through the use of the "token_endpoint_auth_method" parameter, which is 
>>>> what § 2.1 is really talking about: secure client authentication (to the 
>>>> token endpoint). 
>>>>  
>>>> With this in mind, my preference and suggestion would be to remove this 
>>>> field. If other protocols need it, they can register and define it (like 
>>>> Connect has done).
>>>>  
>>>>  -- Justin
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> On Jul 8, 2014, at 4:38 PM, Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> I put it back because otherwise, we wouldn't be meeting one of the 
>>>>> requirements of the RFC 6749.  If you look at the client registration 
>>>>> section http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2, you'll see that 
>>>>> registering redirect_uri values is required, as is registering the client 
>>>>> type.  Without this, there wasn't a way to register the client type.
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>>                                                             -- Mike
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: OAuth [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of John Bradley
>>>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2014 12:37 PM
>>>>> To: Phil Hunt
>>>>> Cc: oauth@ietf.org
>>>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Dynamic Client Registration: application_type
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>> It was taken out and then put back in as it is a common parameter used by 
>>>>> a number of AS.
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>> We have it in Connect, the best reason for keeping it is to stop people 
>>>>> from coming up with a new parameter for the same thing because they 
>>>>> haven't looked at the Connect version.
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>> John B.
>>>>>
>>>>> On Jul 8, 2014, at 3:16 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>> > Does this need to be in the spec?  I believe we've already said that 
>>>>> > others can add attributes as they need.
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> > Phil
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> > @independentid
>>>>>
>>>>> > www.independentid.com
>>>>>
>>>>> > phil.h...@oracle.com
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> > On Jul 8, 2014, at 11:56 AM, John Bradley <ve7...@ve7jtb.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>> >> The application_type is collected as part of current registration by 
>>>>> >> Google and some other OAuth providers as part of registering redirect 
>>>>> >> uri.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>
>>>>> >> The text was cut down to allow more flexibility in OAuth.  Connect 
>>>>> >> requires registration of redirect_uri and is more ridged about it than 
>>>>> >> OAuth 2.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>
>>>>> >> Do you think the Connect wording would be appropriate for OAuth?
>>>>>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>
>>>>> >> John B.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>
>>>>> >> On Jul 8, 2014, at 9:22 AM, Hannes Tschofenig 
>>>>> >> <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> This additional information makes a lot of sense.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> As you said in an earlier mail, the attempt to copy text from the
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> OpenID Connect spec failed a bit...
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> On 07/08/2014 02:49 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> I suppose authors has imported one of the security feature of
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> OpenID Connect here as well. In the Dynamic Client Registration
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> standard, which is a bit longer than IETF version. You can see the 
>>>>> >>>> reason from it:
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> application_type
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  OPTIONAL. Kind of the application. The default, if omitted, is web.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  The defined values are native or web. Web Clients using the OAuth 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Implicit Grant Type MUST only register URLs using the https scheme 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> as redirect_uris; they MUST NOT use localhost as the hostname.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Native Clients MUST only register redirect_uris using custom URI 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> schemes or URLs using the http: scheme with localhost as the 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> hostname. Authorization Servers MAY place additional constraints on 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Native Clients. Authorization Servers MAY reject Redirection URI 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> values using the http scheme, other than the localhost case for 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Native Clients. The Authorization Server MUST verify that all the 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> registered redirect_uris conform to these constraints. This
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> prevents  sharing a Client ID across different types of Clients.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Nat
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> 2014-07-08 21:17 GMT+09:00 Hannes Tschofenig
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> <hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> <mailto:hannes.tschofe...@gmx.net>>:
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Hi all,
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  with version -18 you guys have added a new meta-data attribute,
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> namely  application_type.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  First, this new attribute is not listed in the IANA consideration 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> section.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Second, could you provide a bit of motivation why you need it?
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> What  would the authorization server do with that type of
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> information? The  description is rather short.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  IMHO there is also no clear boundary between a "native" and "web" 
>>>>> >>>>app.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Just think about smart phone apps that are developed using 
>>>>> >>>>JavaScript.
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Would this be a web app or a native app?
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Here is the definition from the draft:
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  application_type
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>        OPTIONAL.  Kind of the application.  The default, if omitted, 
>>>>> >>>>is
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>        "web".  The defined values are "native" or "web".
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Ciao
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  Hannes
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>  OAuth@ietf.org <mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> 
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> --
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>> @_nat_en
>>>>>
>>>>> >>>
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>
>>>>> >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>> >>
>>>>>
>>>>> >> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> >> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> >> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>
>>>>> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>> >
>>>>>
>>>>>  
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>>
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> OAuth mailing list
>>>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>> -- 
>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/
>>> @_nat_en
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>>
>> OAuth mailing list
>>
>> OAuth@ietf.org
>>
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
>>
>  
>
>  
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