In 3.3 It is saying that the refresh token is a secret that the Authorization 
server has bound to the client_id, that the Authorization server effectively 
uses to differentiate between instances of that client_id.

When the refresh token is generated, it can be stored in a table with the 
client_id and the information about the grant.   You could also do it 
statelesly by creating a signed object as the refresh token. 
The spec is silent on the exact programming method that the Authorization 
server uses.

In 3.7 Deployment independent describes using the same client_id across 
multiple instances of a native client, or multiple instances of a Java Script 
client running in a browsers with the same callback uri.

Since the publishing of this RFC we have also developed a spec for dynamic 
client registration so it is possible to give every native client it's own 
client_id and secret making them confidential clients.

There is also a middle ground some people take by doing a proof of possession 
for code in native applications to prevent the interception of responses to the 
client by malicious applications on the device.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-sakimura-oauth-tcse/

John B.

On Jun 25, 2014, at 8:06 PM, Madjid Nakhjiri <m.nakhj...@samsung.com> wrote:

> Hi all,
>  
> I am new to OAUTH list and OAUTH, so apologies if this is very off-topic.
>  
> I am evaluating an OAUTH 2.0 implementation that is done based on bare bone 
> base OAUTH2.0 RFC. From what I understand, many (or some) client 
> implementations use a “global ID/secret” pair for all instances of the 
> client.  Looking at RFC 6819 and there seem to be a whole page on this topic, 
> if I understand it correctly. So questions:
>  
> 1)      Section 3.7 talks about deployment-independent versus deployment 
> specific client IDs. I am guessing “deployment-independent” refers to what I 
> called “global”, meaning if I have the same client with the same client ID 
> installed in many end devices, that is a deployment independent case, correct?
> 2)      Section 3.3 on refresh token mentions that the token is secret bound 
> to the client ID and client instance. Could somebody please point me to where 
> the token generation and binding is described? Also how is the client 
> instance is identified?   
>  
> Thanks a lot in advance,
> Madjid Nakhjiri
>  
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

_______________________________________________
OAuth mailing list
OAuth@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth

Reply via email to