It's a pretty good shortcut to not have to deal with request tokens, to be able to use scopes, to have access to client assertions and other methods of client auth, and not have to do signing when talking to the AS. It's no shortcut when talking to the RS, that's for sure.
-- Justin On Feb 15, 2013, at 4:52 PM, Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com<mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com>> wrote: Sorry. I have to disagree. The way 1.0 is written, it is not a shortcut to turn it into a token for 2. Phil Sent from my phone. On 2013-02-15, at 13:04, William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>> wrote: >I've brought it up before, but I think it might be worthwhile, at least as an >exercise, to define a method to get OAuth1-style tokens from an OAuth2 token >endpoint. You'd defer to OAuth1 for how to use them >with a protected resource. YES! ________________________________ From: Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org<mailto:jric...@mitre.org>> To: Tim Bray <twb...@google.com<mailto:twb...@google.com>> Cc: William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>>; IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Sent: Friday, February 15, 2013 12:54 PM Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Minutes from the OAuth Design Team Conference Call - 11th February 2013 So that you can fetch and manage all your tokens using the same code paths as the OAuth2 services. The "get a token" part will be identical to Oauth2 Bearer (except for some details of what comes back from the token endpoint, of course), it's the "use a token" bit that really changes and is up in the air. You get to use scopes, and state, and refresh tokens, and all the other good stuff. I've brought it up before, but I think it might be worthwhile, at least as an exercise, to define a method to get OAuth1-style tokens from an OAuth2 token endpoint. You'd defer to OAuth1 for how to use them with a protected resource. -- Justin On 02/15/2013 11:49 AM, Tim Bray wrote: Not deeply acquainted with the Flickr scenario, but it occurs to me to ask: If OAuth 1.0 is working well for them, why don’t they just keep using it? I.e. if there’s already a good solution in place for people who require secure authn/authz over insecure channels, why would we go the extra work of duplicating that in OAuth 2 territory? -T On Fri, Feb 15, 2013 at 8:09 AM, William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>> wrote: I'll repeat the use case for Flickr, which requires OAuth 1.0a type capabilites that OAuth 2 does not provide. Simply stating "move to HTTPS" is not a viable response here. ________________________________ From: Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net<mailto:tors...@lodderstedt.net>> To: William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>> Cc: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com<mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>>; Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org<mailto:jric...@mitre.org>>; Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com<mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com>>; IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Sent: Friday, February 15, 2013 7:22 AM Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Minutes from the OAuth Design Team Conference Call - 11th February 2013 Hi Bill, I think one needs to compare the costs/impact of HTTPS on one side and the implementation of integrity protection and replay detection on the other. We had this discussion several times. regards, Torsten. Am 15.02.2013 um 08:08 schrieb William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>>: I fundamentally disagree with that too. OAuth 2 is the *framework*, one which supports multiple token types. Bearer tokens were the first credential type defined. OAuth 1.0a also requires HTTPS transport for authentication and getting the token. There are real use cases for tokens usable over plain text with integrity protection. -bill ________________________________ From: Torsten Lodderstedt <tors...@lodderstedt.net<mailto:tors...@lodderstedt.net>> To: William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>> Cc: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com<mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>>; Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org<mailto:jric...@mitre.org>>; Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com<mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com>>; IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Sent: Thursday, February 14, 2013 10:05 PM Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Minutes from the OAuth Design Team Conference Call - 11th February 2013 Hi Bill, OAuth 2.0 took a different direction by relying on HTTPS to provide the basic protection. So the need to have a token, which can be used for service requests over plain HTTP is arguable. My understanding of this activity was, the intend is to provide additional protection on top of HTTPS. regards, Torsten. Am 15.02.2013 um 02:31 schrieb William Mills <wmills_92...@yahoo.com<mailto:wmills_92...@yahoo.com>>: I disagree with "That was the impediment to OAuth 1.0 adoption that OAuth 2.0 solved in the first place.", unless "solving" means does not address the need for it at all. OAuth 2 does several good things, but it still lacks a defined token type that is safe to user over plain text HTTP. 1.0a solved that. ________________________________ From: Mike Jones <michael.jo...@microsoft.com<mailto:michael.jo...@microsoft.com>> To: Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org<mailto:jric...@mitre.org>>; Phil Hunt <phil.h...@oracle.com<mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com>> Cc: IETF oauth WG <oauth@ietf.org<mailto:oauth@ietf.org>> Sent: Thursday, February 14, 2013 1:44 PM Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Minutes from the OAuth Design Team Conference Call - 11th February 2013 I'm in favor of reusing the JWT work that this WG is also doing. :-) I'm pretty skeptical of us inventing another custom scheme for signing HTTP headers. That was the impediment to OAuth 1.0 adoption that OAuth 2.0 solved in the first place. -- Mike -----Original Message----- From: oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org> [mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org<mailto:oauth-boun...@ietf.org>] On Behalf Of Justin Richer Sent: Tuesday, February 12, 2013 9:35 AM To: Phil Hunt Cc: IETF oauth WG Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Minutes from the OAuth Design Team Conference Call - 11th February 2013 That's my reading of it as well, Phil, thanks for providing the clarification. One motivator behind using a JSON-based token is to be able to re-use some of the great work that the JOSE group is doing but apply it to an HTTP payload. What neither of us want is a token type that requires stuffing all query, header, and other parameters *into* the JSON object itself, which would be a more SOAPy approach. -- Justin On 02/12/2013 12:30 PM, Phil Hunt wrote: > Clarification. I think Justin and I were in agreement that we don't want to > see a format that requires JSON payloads. We are both interested in a JSON > token used in the authorization header that could be based on a computed > signature of some combination of http headers and body if possible. > > Phil > > @independentid > www.independentid.com<http://www.independentid.com/> > phil.h...@oracle.com<mailto:phil.h...@oracle.com> > > > > > > On 2013-02-12, at 1:10 AM, Hannes Tschofenig wrote: > >> Here are my notes. >> >> Participants: >> >> * John Bradley >> * Derek Atkins >> * Phil Hunt >> * Prateek Mishra >> * Hannes Tschofenig >> * Mike Jones >> * Antonio Sanso >> * Justin Richer >> >> Notes: >> >> My slides are available here: >> http://www.tschofenig.priv.at/OAuth2-Security-11Feb2013.ppt >> >> Slide #2 summarizes earlier discussions during the conference calls. >> >> -- HTTP vs. JSON >> >> Phil noted that he does not like to use the MAC Token draft as a starting >> point because it does not re-use any of the work done in the JOSE working >> group and in particular all the libraries that are available today. He >> mentioned that earlier attempts to write the MAC Token code lead to problems >> for implementers. >> >> Justin responded that he does not agree with using JSON as a transport >> mechanism since this would replicate a SOAP style. >> >> Phil noted that he wants to send JSON but the signature shall be computed >> over the HTTP header field. >> >> -- Flexibility for the keyed message digest computation >> >> From earlier discussion it was clear that the conference call participants >> wanted more flexibility regarding the keyed message digest computation. For >> this purpose Hannes presented the DKIM based approach, which allows >> selective header fields to be included in the digest. This is shown in slide >> #4. >> >> After some discussion the conference call participants thought that this >> would meet their needs. Further investigations would still be useful to >> determine the degree of failed HMAC calculations due to HTTP proxies >> modifying the content. >> >> -- Key Distribution >> >> Hannes presented the open issue regarding the choice of key >> distribution. Slides #6-#8 present three techniques and Hannes asked >> for feedback regarding the preferred style. Justin and others didn't >> see the need to decide on one mechanism - they wanted to keep the >> choice open. Derek indicated that this will not be an acceptable >> approach. Since the resource server and the authorization server may, >> in the OAuth 2.0 framework, be entities produced by different vendors >> there is an interoperability need. Justin responded that he disagrees >> and that the resource server needs to understand the access token and >> referred to the recent draft submission for the token introspection >> endpoint. Derek indicated that the resource server has to understand >> the content of the access token and the token introspection endpoint >> just pushes the problem around: the resource server has to send the >> access token to the authorization server and then the resource server >> gets the result back (which he the n > a >> gain needs to understand) in order to make a meaningful authorization >> decision. >> >> Everyone agreed that the client must receive the session key from the >> authorization server and that this approach has to be standardized. It was >> also agreed that this is a common approach among all three key distribution >> mechanisms. >> >> Hannes asked the participants to think about their preference. >> >> The questions regarding key naming and the indication for the intended >> resource server the client wants to talk to have been postponed. >> >> Ciao >> Hannes >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth _______________________________________________ OAuth mailing list OAuth@ietf.org<mailto:OAuth@ietf.org> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth
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