On 02/08/2013 12:51 AM, Prabath Siriwardena wrote:
Hi Justin,

I have couple of questions related to "valid" parameter...

This endpoint can be invoked by the Resource Server in runtime...

That's correct.


In that case what is exactly meant by the "resource_id" in request ?

The resource_id field is a service-specific string that basically lets the resource server provide some context to the request to the auth server. There have been some other suggestions like client IP address, but I wanted to put this one in because it seemed to be a common theme. The client is trying to do *something* with the token, after all, and the rights, permissions, and metadata associated with the token could change based on that. Since the Introspection endpoint is all about getting that metadata back to the PR, this seemed like a good idea.


IMO a token to be valid depends on set of criteria based on it's type..

For a Bearer token..

1. Token should not be expired
2. Token should not be revoked.
3. The scope the token issued should match with the scope required for the resource.

For a MAC token...

1. Token not expired (mac id)
2. Token should not be revoked
3. The scope the token issued should match with the scope required for the resource.
4. HMAC check should be valid

There are similar conditions for SAML bearer too..

This isn't really true. The SAML bearer token is fully self-contained and doesn't change based on other parameters in the message, unlike MAC. Same with JWT. When it hands a SAML or JWT token to the AS, the PR has given *everything* the server needs to check that token's validity and use.

MAC signatures change with every message, and they're done across several components of the HTTP message. Therefor, the HMAC check for MAC style tokens will still need to be done by the protected resource. Introspection would help in the case that the signature validated just fine, but the token might have expired. Or you need to know what scopes apply. Introspection isn't to fully validate the call to the protected resource -- if that were the case, the PR would have to send some kind of encapsulated version of the original request. Otherwise, the AS won't have all of the information it needs to check the MAC.


I think what you're describing is ultimately *not* what the introspection endpoint is intended to do. If that's unclear from the document, can you please suggest text that would help clear the use case up? I wouldn't want it to be ambiguous.

 -- Justin


Thanks & regards,
-Prabath


On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 10:30 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org <mailto:jric...@mitre.org>> wrote:

    It validates the token, which would be either the token itself in
    the case of Bearer or the token "id" part of something more
    complex like MAC. It doesn't directly validate the usage of the
    token, that's still up to the PR to do that.

    I nearly added a "token type" field in this draft, but held back
    because there are several kinds of "token type" that people talk
    about in OAuth. First, there's "Bearer" vs. "MAC" vs. "HOK", or
    what have you. Then within Bearer you have "JWT" or "SAML" or
    "unstructured blob". Then you've also got "access" vs. "refresh"
    and other flavors of token, like the id_token in OpenID Connect.

    Thing is, the server running the introspection endpoint will
    probably know *all* of these. But should it tell the client? If
    so, which of the three, and what names should the fields be?

     -- Justin


    On 02/07/2013 11:26 AM, Prabath Siriwardena wrote:
    Okay.. I was thinking this could be used as a way to validate the
    token as well. BTW even in this case shouldn't communicate the
    type of token to AS? For example in the case of SAML profile - it
    could be SAML token..

    Thanks & regards,
    -Prabath

    On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 8:39 PM, Justin Richer <jric...@mitre.org
    <mailto:jric...@mitre.org>> wrote:

        "valid" might not be the best term, but it's meant to be a
        field where the server says "yes this token is still good" or
        "no this token isn't good anymore". We could instead do this
        with HTTP codes or something but I went with a pure JSON
        response.

         -- Justin


        On 02/06/2013 10:47 PM, Prabath Siriwardena wrote:
        Hi Justin,

        I believe this is addressing one of the key missing part in
        OAuth 2.0...

        One question - I guess this was discussed already...

        In the spec - in the introspection response it has the
        attribute "valid" - this is basically the validity of the
        token provided in the request.

        Validation criteria depends on the token and well as token
        type ( Bearer, MAC..).

        In the spec it seems like it's coupled with Bearer token
        type... But I guess, by adding "token_type" to the request
        we can remove this dependency.

        WDYT..?

        Thanks & regards,
        -Prabath

        On Thu, Feb 7, 2013 at 12:54 AM, Justin Richer
        <jric...@mitre.org <mailto:jric...@mitre.org>> wrote:

            Updated introspection draft based on recent comments.
            Changes include:

             - "scope" return parameter now follows RFC6749 format
            instead of JSON array
             - "subject" -> "sub", and "audience" -> "aud", to be
            parallel with JWT claims
             - clarified what happens if the authentication is bad

             -- Justin


            -------- Original Message --------
            Subject:    New Version Notification for
            draft-richer-oauth-introspection-02.txt
            Date:       Wed, 6 Feb 2013 11:24:20 -0800
            From:       <internet-dra...@ietf.org>
            <mailto:internet-dra...@ietf.org>
            To:         <jric...@mitre.org> <mailto:jric...@mitre.org>



            A new version of I-D, draft-richer-oauth-introspection-02.txt
            has been successfully submitted by Justin Richer and posted to the
            IETF repository.

            Filename:    draft-richer-oauth-introspection
            Revision:    02
            Title:               OAuth Token Introspection
            Creation date:       2013-02-06
            WG ID:               Individual Submission
            Number of pages: 6
            
URL:http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richer-oauth-introspection-02.txt
            
Status:http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-richer-oauth-introspection
            
Htmlized:http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-richer-oauth-introspection-02
            
Diff:http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-richer-oauth-introspection-02

            Abstract:
                This specification defines a method for a client or protected
                resource to query an OAuth authorization server to determine 
meta-
                information about an OAuth token.



            The IETF Secretariat




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-- Thanks & Regards,
        Prabath

        Mobile : +94 71 809 6732 <tel:%2B94%2071%20809%206732>

        http://blog.facilelogin.com
        http://RampartFAQ.com




-- Thanks & Regards,
    Prabath

    Mobile : +94 71 809 6732 <tel:%2B94%2071%20809%206732>

    http://blog.facilelogin.com
    http://RampartFAQ.com




--
Thanks & Regards,
Prabath

Mobile : +94 71 809 6732

http://blog.facilelogin.com
http://RampartFAQ.com

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