On 27/11/12 15:48, Richer, Justin P. wrote:
Yes, the client can keep two tokens and try using both of them if it wants to.
I think that you're conflating revocation and expiration here, and missing a
key use case: downscoping. Let's say the client gets an access grant for [A, B,
C], and it gets RT and AT1 for those scopes. The client then wants to call a
service with *only* scope B, so it sends RT in with scope B in the refresh
request to get AT2 with that scope alone. AT1 is still valid, assuming it
hasn't expired or otherwise been revoked. The client can choose which AT to
present to the protected resources in different situations.
That is complex :-). Using a refresh token to downscope and keep a
number of access tokens is definitely beyond my imagination at the
moment, why would a client want to downscope its access token ?
Is it basically described at:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-zeltsan-oauth-use-cases-03#section-3.10 ?
I'm still not getting though why access token with the richer set of
scopes needs to be explicitly downscoped by the client, is it because
using a token with a richer set of scopes can lead to some authorization
issues ?
I was thinking that the down-scoping only makes sense during the
authorization code flow where AS downscopes what the client has
requested but obviously I'm only at the start of the learning curve :-).
In all of these cases, it's completely up to the AS and the PRs whether or not
any of the tokens in the wild are still valid. Your AS might decide that once a
RT is used, it will simply throw away all existing AT's attached to that RT.
That's totally a valid use case, and the client needs to be able to handle that
(in the same way that it handles any invalid token).
If you want the clients to explicitly throw out tokens, use the Token
Revocation spec.
OK, that makes sense now.
Thanks, Sergey
-- Justin
On Nov 27, 2012, at 10:41 AM, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
On 27/11/12 15:29, Richer, Justin P. wrote:
The client can indeed save a round trip by proactively refreshing the access
token. This does not necessarily revoke the existing access token. Many
implementations do that, so your mileage may vary.
I don't understand.
So the client will still have the existing access token which may have not been
revoked, and then also another access token which was just returned in response
to the refresh grant request ?
And if you mean that no actual revocation is actually done, why then have the
client worry about doing the proactive refresh ?
I can imagine that may be that it will only be the actual refresh token
refreshed itself, but why keep the access token if the client has requested a
refresh ?
Sergey
-- Justin
On Nov 27, 2012, at 5:18 AM, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
On 27/11/12 08:52, Guangqing Deng wrote:
It seems that the client cannot know whether the refresh token should be
used until a HTTP 401 error is returned from the resource server due to
the expiration of current access token or some other reasons. However, a
period of time cannot be ignored will be spent on obtain a new access
token using the refresh token after the resource server returns a HTTP
401 error to the client, which may degrade the user experience since the
real-time nature of the service cannot be guaranteed. Is a mechanism by
which the client can check the validity of the access token (or the
refresh token) in advance needed by Oauth?
I believe an access token response may offer an expires_in parameter which can
provide some hint. Actually this raises an interesting question.
Suppose the client actually checks this parameter and decides to use
a refresh token it also has to pro-actively refresh its current token.
IMHO this should work even if the access token has not expired yet and effectively
represents another form of a client-initiated revocation of the access token ? It will
mean a client which works with the "expires_in" parameter can save a one round
trip (the one which returns a failure in case of the access token being expired) ?
Does it make sense ? If it does, can some relevant wording make it into the
revocation token draft ?
Cheers, Sergey
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Guangqing Deng
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*From:* Justin Richer<jric...@mitre.org>
*To:* Sergey Beryozkin<sberyoz...@gmail.com>
*Cc:* oauth@ietf.org
*Sent:* Wednesday, November 21, 2012 6:11 AM
*Subject:* Re: [OAUTH-WG] How the client can decide it is time to use
the refresh token
There's no signaling regarding the validity of the refresh token from
the protected resource. In more distributed setups, the protected
resources know nothing about the refresh tokens because the PR never
sees them. In any case. the code path is fairly straightforward, even if
both tokens are expired:
- client presents AT to resource
- resource returns data, AT worked
- [or] resource returns 400 error to client, AT didn't work
- client presents RT to auth server
- auth server returns new AT, RT worked
- [or] auth server returns 400 error to client, RT didn't work
- client has to go get a new auth grant from the resource owner,
start over
-- Justin
On 11/21/2012 06:50 AM, Sergey Beryozkin wrote:
Hi
I'm looking for some guidance on how the client which already owns an
access token can decide, after getting HTTP 400 back from the resource
server it tries to access on behalf of the end user/resource owner, can
decide that the refresh token it has can now be used to get a new access
token.
[1] refers to various error conditions but it is not obvious to me
that the same conditions (some of them) should or can be reported during
the actual client accessing the protected resource.
My question is, what error condition, if any, from [1] should be
reported back to the client failing to access a protected resource due
to the access token being invalid or expired, so that it can help the
client who also owns the refresh token to decide it can use it now...
Thanks, Sergey
[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
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