I really don't see it this way, as a failure. Instead, I think we've managed to successfully scope the document to address important practices and bits of the protocol that will work in tandem with other documents to solve different use cases. One of the biggest problems that we saw coming in from OAuth1.0 was that it tried to be all things to all people all at once, which also didn't help interoperability. I think that what we have is a more composable UNIXy approach here. Namely, OAuth 2 core/framework/whatever does one thing and does it well: it outlines a standard means and structure for getting a token. Does that help you use the token against a web service, do service discovery, pack information into the token itself? No, but it wasn't meant to. It was meant to leave enough space for other docs to take care of that.

But I do not think that it's gone so far as to leave a morass of unusable components, much in the way that WS-* did, and I don't think the comparison is a fair one. I think the separations are clean and the usage profiles are clear.

By pointing developers to other specifications, most of which are products of this very working group or members of this working group under other umbrellas, we *can* provide a wider view of the world. At the absolute least, I think it needs to point to the two token type docs, and I'd suggest at least keeping the two token format docs as well. And as was pointed out by Phil Hunt, this notion of loosely coupled specs and components is actually *beneficial* to today's web environment. This is another way that this work differs from WS-*: if you're doing one part of WS-*, you're not going to get away without doing the rest of it too if you want to have a working system. As you point out, and somewhat lament, this is not the case with OAuth 2. You can do some parts, and not others, and utalize just the bits that you need. The fact that I can use the same endpoints and mechanisms for user-delegated auth and machine-directed auth is very powerful, and the fact that I can use the same exact client libraries to fetch and use both random-hex tokens and signed JWTs is equally powerful. The fact that I can reuse 90% of that code and also get signed MAC tokens is likewise powerful.

Thus, I stand by my originally-suggested text and respectfully submit it to the editor and working group for consideration of inclusion in this section.

 -- Justin

On 01/26/2012 12:49 PM, Eran Hammer wrote:

-----Original Message-----
From: Justin Richer [mailto:jric...@mitre.org]
Sent: Thursday, January 26, 2012 6:07 AM
To: Eran Hammer
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] AD Review of -22 (part II)

I realize that -23 is already published with the below text, but since this is a
whole new section and nobody else seemed to bring it up, I wanted to make
sure it wasn't missed by the WG.
I think it's a good idea to call it out, and I don't want to "sugarcoat" it 
either,
but the phrase "this specification is likely to produce a wide range of non-
interoperable implementations" is a bit overdramatic in its tone. Instead, I
think we should point to other documents that are being developed explicitly
along side of this, such as at the beginning of RFC2904
(http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2904). I suggest text like the following instead:

OAuth 2.0 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined security
properties. However, as a rich and highly extensible framework with many
optional components, this specification does not seek to define all
components needed for a fully interoperable deployment within this
document. Instead, this specification is intended to work with complimentary
documents that define token types [MAC] [Bearer], token formats [JWT]
[SAML], client registration [Dynamic Reg?], endpoint discovery [XRD] [SWD],
and other considerations.
This protocol was designed with the clear expectation that future work will
define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve full web-
scale interoperability.
This does sugarcoat the fact that 2.0 does not provide *any* guaranteed 
interoperability. The implementations I've seen so far have simply adopted a 
*profile* of this document along with bearer tokens. We've already seen 
feedback on this list where client developers were surprised and frustrated 
with such implementations when trying to reuse code across providers and this 
is only going to get more noticeable. And then of course we have the insane 
complexity of the over-architected solutions, adding layer after layer to solve 
problems that are as simple as making a parameter required and well specified.

We've also seen questions about providers looking to claim OAuth 2.0 support 
while maintaining all their existing architecture and security properties, 
seeking to push the boundaries of what is permitted by the specification. We've 
gone to a place where *anything* can be made to look like OAuth. We've seen 
implementations doing nothing but exchanging SAML assertions for JSON-formatted 
assertions (or other SAML assertions), without any actual resource owner 
participation, calling itself OAuth. And sadly, it can.

I'm against adding such a laundry list of references. I am also opposed to 
implying that using these extensions will achieve interoperability because they 
will not in their current state. The only way to achieve interoperability at 
this point is by getting rid of most of the optional components (removed or 
made required), and tightening the definition of others. Or alternatively, come 
out with a full blown discovery and negotiation protocol - something that would 
be extremely premature at this point. How can you design a good 
discovery/negotiation protocol before you have even a partial picture of what 
it is you want to discovery/negotiate.

Instead, I proposing a small tweak (marked with [[ ]]) to the language:

---
1.7.  Interoperability

    OAuth 2.0 provides a rich authorization framework with well-defined
    security properties.  However, as a rich and highly extensible
    framework with many optional components, [[ on its own, ]] this 
specification is likely
    to produce a wide range of non-interoperable implementations.  In
    addition, this specification leaves a few required components
    partially or fully undefined (e.g. client registration, authorization
    server capabilities, endpoint discovery).

    This protocol was designed with the clear expectation that future work
    will define prescriptive profiles and extensions necessary to achieve
    full web-scale interoperability.
---

I can appreciate feeling a little sting from such a disclaimer but we all 
deserve it for failing to do our job. We took on a successful, simple, narrow, 
and useful protocol and turned it into mush because after more than 2 years we 
have failed to find common ground on almost anything that is required to 
achieve interoperability. Instead we now rely on popular providers such as 
Facebook and Twitter to set the tone for the rest of the industry, filling in 
the gaps.

My personal frustration is from the fact that a significant number of working 
group members put the interest of their corporate overlord above what is good 
for the web. They have aggressively promoted an agenda based on product lines 
already in advance stages of development and refused to compromise if that 
meant making changes to their products. We have produced the closest heir to 
WS-* I've seen in many years, and that's nothing to be proud of.

The result is pretty obvious: claiming OAuth 2.0 support or even compliance is 
meaningless. It's the difference between dancing the tango and dancing to rock 
music. One gives you a beautifully synced performance while the other put 
personal expression on a pedestal. Which one do you think is better for a web 
protocol?

It's time to own the results of our work and to clearly state that this is the 
best we were able to produce, and let the industry take over and solve through 
running code the problems we were too fragmented to solve here.

EHL










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