The approach looks right to me; the key is that the 1.0 state machine is
rather simple. A priori, I don't see the 2.0 as more complex (even
though it involves an additional machine), and I think it should be
straight-forward to build the machine and run the reachability analysis
on the system graph.
The conclusions of this paper puzzle me though. There are things that I
simply do not understand. For instance, what does this mean: "The
current OAuth specification uses nonce, timestamps and signatures to
guard against possible attacks. If the API interfaces are secure, they
are not needed. On the other hand, if the API interfaces are insecure,
they are not sufficient to guarantee the desired security properties."
Igor
Mark Mcgloin wrote:
Does anyone know of a formal security protocol analysis that has been
carried out for OAuth 2.0?
I could only find analysis done against 1.0a, like this one:
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5762765
thanks
Mark
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