But that wasn't the question... it was whether the two are closely related (as 
in, should be defined in the same specification) and likely to be used together.

EHL

From: Luke Shepard [mailto:lshep...@facebook.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 26, 2010 7:29 AM
To: Allen Tom
Cc: Eran Hammer-Lahav; Dick Hardt; OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] 'immediate' without identity

This is a legitimate concern. One other possible way to prevent this issue is 
for the client to interpret the response, clear state, and refresh the page. 
This is the suggested way that many Connect sites handle the situation.

I don't disagree that it may be nice to allow the client to pass a username for 
verification. I think that it should not be required, as responsible clients 
can do the right thing. Requiring a username prevents a whole class of possible 
use cases - most notably, single sign on when you don't currently know the user 
at all.

On May 25, 2010, at 6:42 PM, Allen Tom wrote:


Yahoo's security team has concerns regarding the immediate mode and shared 
computers.

Consider the case where a browser based JS app is running in a browser tab with 
credentials belonging to a particular user. While the app is still running, the 
original user lets a friend borrow the browser. The friend opens another tab, 
logs the original user out of the Service Provider, and then logs in as 
different user using the friend's account.

At this point - the app is still running as the original user a different tab. 
If the app's credentials expire, it could attempt an immediate request to 
refresh them - which could then return the credentials belonging to the 2nd 
user. Since this is a JS app - the data that belongs to the first user is 
already loaded, so the app could start co-mingling the data between the two 
users.

At Yahoo, we call this scenario  "crossing the streams" - and that's always a 
really bad thing.

This scenario could be really disastrous if the SP has a login CSRF 
vulnerability - meaning that an attacker can CSRF the victim's browser into 
logging in with the attacker's account. This vulnerability would result in the 
victim's data mixing with the Attacker.

One possible way to prevent this issue is for the client to pass the user's 
identifier (or access token/refresh token/etc) in the immediate request.

Allen


On 5/24/10 1:05 PM, "Eran Hammer-Lahav" 
<e...@hueniverse.com<x-msg://77/e...@hueniverse.com>> wrote:


I am more interested in how you plan to address the (long term) security and 
privacy issue: who is responsible to prevent one user in getting an access 
token for another in a shared computer environment. As long as the user goes to 
facebook.com<http://facebook.com>, you show they who is logged in clearly, so 
if it is not them, they can log out.

But using immediate without a username, it sounds to me like you expect the 
client to do the right thing. Is this how you plan to address this? Ask the 
client to find out whose access token it got, display it to the user, and allow 
them to correct this? Especially given that at this point the client account is 
already "paired" with the access token.

EHL


On 5/24/10 12:44 PM, "Luke Shepard" 
<lshep...@facebook.com<x-msg://77/lshep...@facebook.com>> wrote:


Suppose the client does not have a username - say, because the cookie expired. 
What is the appropriate behavior?

Would you require the client to spawn a popup or redirect to a full page auth 
every time a user revisits their site? This doesn't make sense.

Under what circumstances do you think the client gives an access token that 
belongs to another user? If the user is logged into the service provider, then 
they can get that access token anyway by just visiting the service provider ...

On May 24, 2010, at 11:18 AM, Dick Hardt wrote:

>
> On 2010-05-24, at 8:55 AM, Eran Hammer-Lahav wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: Dick Hardt [mailto:dick.ha...@gmail.com]
>>> Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 7:35 AM
>>> To: Eran Hammer-Lahav
>>> Cc: OAuth WG (oauth@ietf.org<x-msg://77/oauth@ietf.org>)
>>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] 'immediate' without identity
>>>
>>> You were looking for use cases for immediate without identity.
>>>
>>> I agree that *if* the client does know the user, then it should tell the 
>>> server.
>>> Are you saying that if the client does not know the user it should not use
>>> immediate?
>>
>> I think the server should reject an immediate request without a username. 
>> Otherwise the server will be giving the client an access token that belongs 
>> to another user.
>
> Now I understand. I agree.
>
> -- Dick
>
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org<x-msg://77/OAuth@ietf.org>
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth


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