On Thu, 14 Jan 2021 00:07:14 +0100
Daniel Borkmann <dan...@iogearbox.net> wrote:

> On 1/12/21 6:45 PM, Jesper Dangaard Brouer wrote:
> > This BPF-helper bpf_check_mtu() works for both XDP and TC-BPF programs.  
> [...]
> > + * int bpf_check_mtu(void *ctx, u32 ifindex, u32 *mtu_len, s32 len_diff, 
> > u64 flags)
> > + * Description
> > + *         Check ctx packet size against MTU of net device (based on
> > + *         *ifindex*).  This helper will likely be used in combination with
> > + *         helpers that adjust/change the packet size.  The argument
> > + *         *len_diff* can be used for querying with a planned size
> > + *         change. This allows to check MTU prior to changing packet ctx.
> > + *
> > + *         Specifying *ifindex* zero means the MTU check is performed
> > + *         against the current net device.  This is practical if this isn't
> > + *         used prior to redirect.
> > + *
> > + *         The Linux kernel route table can configure MTUs on a more
> > + *         specific per route level, which is not provided by this helper.
> > + *         For route level MTU checks use the **bpf_fib_lookup**\ ()
> > + *         helper.
> > + *
> > + *         *ctx* is either **struct xdp_md** for XDP programs or
> > + *         **struct sk_buff** for tc cls_act programs.
> > + *
> > + *         The *flags* argument can be a combination of one or more of the
> > + *         following values:
> > + *
> > + *         **BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS**
> > + *                 This flag will only works for *ctx* **struct sk_buff**.
> > + *                 If packet context contains extra packet segment buffers
> > + *                 (often knows as GSO skb), then MTU check is harder to
> > + *                 check at this point, because in transmit path it is
> > + *                 possible for the skb packet to get re-segmented
> > + *                 (depending on net device features).  This could still be
> > + *                 a MTU violation, so this flag enables performing MTU
> > + *                 check against segments, with a different violation
> > + *                 return code to tell it apart. Check cannot use len_diff.
> > + *
> > + *         On return *mtu_len* pointer contains the MTU value of the net
> > + *         device.  Remember the net device configured MTU is the L3 size,
> > + *         which is returned here and XDP and TX length operate at L2.
> > + *         Helper take this into account for you, but remember when using
> > + *         MTU value in your BPF-code.  On input *mtu_len* must be a valid
> > + *         pointer and be initialized (to zero), else verifier will reject
> > + *         BPF program.
> > + *
> > + * Return
> > + *         * 0 on success, and populate MTU value in *mtu_len* pointer.
> > + *
> > + *         * < 0 if any input argument is invalid (*mtu_len* not updated)
> > + *
> > + *         MTU violations return positive values, but also populate MTU
> > + *         value in *mtu_len* pointer, as this can be needed for
> > + *         implementing PMTU handing:
> > + *
> > + *         * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED**
> > + *         * **BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG**
> > + *
> >    */
> >   #define __BPF_FUNC_MAPPER(FN)             \
> >     FN(unspec),                     \
> > @@ -3998,6 +4053,7 @@ union bpf_attr {
> >     FN(ktime_get_coarse_ns),        \
> >     FN(ima_inode_hash),             \
> >     FN(sock_from_file),             \
> > +   FN(check_mtu),                  \
> >     /* */
> >   
> >   /* integer value in 'imm' field of BPF_CALL instruction selects which 
> > helper
> > @@ -5030,6 +5086,17 @@ struct bpf_redir_neigh {
> >     };
> >   };
> >   
> > +/* bpf_check_mtu flags*/
> > +enum  bpf_check_mtu_flags {
> > +   BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS  = (1U << 0),
> > +};
> > +
> > +enum bpf_check_mtu_ret {
> > +   BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS,      /* check and lookup successful */
> > +   BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED,  /* fragmentation required to fwd */
> > +   BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG,  /* GSO re-segmentation needed to fwd */
> > +};
> > +
> >   enum bpf_task_fd_type {
> >     BPF_FD_TYPE_RAW_TRACEPOINT,     /* tp name */
> >     BPF_FD_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,         /* tp name */
> > diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
> > index db59ab55572c..3f2e593244ca 100644
> > --- a/net/core/filter.c
> > +++ b/net/core/filter.c
> > @@ -5604,6 +5604,124 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto 
> > bpf_skb_fib_lookup_proto = {
> >     .arg4_type      = ARG_ANYTHING,
> >   };
> >   
> > +static struct net_device *__dev_via_ifindex(struct net_device *dev_curr,
> > +                                       u32 ifindex)
> > +{
> > +   struct net *netns = dev_net(dev_curr);
> > +
> > +   /* Non-redirect use-cases can use ifindex=0 and save ifindex lookup */
> > +   if (ifindex == 0)
> > +           return dev_curr;
> > +
> > +   return dev_get_by_index_rcu(netns, ifindex);
> > +}
> > +
> > +BPF_CALL_5(bpf_skb_check_mtu, struct sk_buff *, skb,
> > +      u32, ifindex, u32 *, mtu_len, s32, len_diff, u64, flags)
> > +{
> > +   int ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED;
> > +   struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
> > +   int skb_len, dev_len;
> > +   int mtu;
> > +
> > +   if (unlikely(flags & ~(BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS)))
> > +           return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > +   dev = __dev_via_ifindex(dev, ifindex);
> > +   if (unlikely(!dev))
> > +           return -ENODEV;
> > +
> > +   mtu = READ_ONCE(dev->mtu);
> > +
> > +   dev_len = mtu + dev->hard_header_len;
> > +   skb_len = skb->len + len_diff; /* minus result pass check */
> > +   if (skb_len <= dev_len) {
> > +           ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS;
> > +           goto out;
> > +   }
> > +   /* At this point, skb->len exceed MTU, but as it include length of all
> > +    * segments, it can still be below MTU.  The SKB can possibly get
> > +    * re-segmented in transmit path (see validate_xmit_skb).  Thus, user
> > +    * must choose if segs are to be MTU checked.  Last SKB "headlen" is
> > +    * checked against MTU.
> > +    */
> > +   if (skb_is_gso(skb)) {
> > +           ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SUCCESS;
> > +
> > +           if (!(flags & BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS))
> > +                   goto out;
> > +
> > +           if (!skb_gso_validate_network_len(skb, mtu)) {
> > +                   ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_SEGS_TOOBIG;
> > +                   goto out;
> > +           }
> > +
> > +           skb_len = skb_headlen(skb) + len_diff;
> > +           if (skb_len > dev_len) {

Maybe I'm misunderstanding you below?  Do you just want the above two
lines moved from the patch? (sure I can do that... as it is just an
extra check of the "head"/first segment of the packet, and only done if
BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS is set)

> 
> This is still not universally correct given drivers could cook up non-linear
> skbs (e.g. page frags) on rx. So the result from BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS flag cannot
> be relied on. 

That is why it is a flag, that need to be explicitly set.

> Do you have a particular use case for the BPF_MTU_CHK_SEGS?

The complaint from Maze (and others) were that when skb_is_gso then all
the MTU checks are bypassed.  This flag enables checking the GSO part
via skb_gso_validate_network_len().  We cannot enable it per default,
as you say, it is universally correct in all cases.

> I also don't see the flag being used anywhere in your selftests, so I presume
> not as otherwise you would have added an example there?

I'm using the flag in the bpf-examples code[1], this is how I've tested
the code path.

I've not found a way to generate GSO packet via the selftests
infrastructure via bpf_prog_test_run_xattr().  I'm 

[1] 
https://github.com/xdp-project/bpf-examples/blob/master/MTU-tests/tc_mtu_enforce.c


> I would just drop the flag altogether for the tc helper..

As explain I cannot drop the flag altogether, I would also have to
remove the code then.  Sorry, but I don't 100% understand the change
you are requesting.


> > +                   ret = BPF_MTU_CHK_RET_FRAG_NEEDED;
> > +                   goto out;
> > +           }
> > +   }
> > +out:
> > +   /* BPF verifier guarantees valid pointer */
> > +   *mtu_len = mtu;
> > +
> > +   return ret;
> > +}  
> 



-- 
Best regards,
  Jesper Dangaard Brouer
  MSc.CS, Principal Kernel Engineer at Red Hat
  LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/brouer

Reply via email to