In ethtool_get_rxnfc(), the object "info" is firstly copied from
user-space. If the FLOW_RSS flag is set in the member field flow_type of
"info" (and cmd is ETHTOOL_GRXFH), info needs to be copied again from
user-space because FLOW_RSS is newer and has new definition, as mentioned
in the comment. However, given that the user data resides in user-space, a
malicious user can race to change the data after the first copy. By doing
so, the user can inject inconsistent data. For example, in the second
copy, the FLOW_RSS flag could be cleared in the field flow_type of "info".
In the following execution, "info" will be used in the function
ops->get_rxnfc(). Such inconsistent data can potentially lead to unexpected
information leakage since ops->get_rxnfc() will prepare various types of
data according to flow_type, and the prepared data will be eventually
copied to user-space. This inconsistent data may also cause undefined
behaviors based on how ops->get_rxnfc() is implemented.
This patch re-verifies the flow_type field of "info" after the second copy.
If the value is not as expected, an error code will be returned.
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6...@umn.edu>
---
net/core/ethtool.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index 03416e6..a121034 100644
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -1032,6 +1032,8 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct
net_device *dev,
info_size = sizeof(info);
if (copy_from_user(&info, useraddr, info_size))
return -EFAULT;
+ if (!(info.flow_type & FLOW_RSS))
+ return -EINVAL;
}
if (info.cmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) {
--
2.7.4
