On 1/6/2018 4:11 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw_frag_vec buffer.
In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further
reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value.
Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.
Cc: "David S. Miller" <da...@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuz...@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshf...@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshet...@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.willi...@intel.com>
---
net/ipv4/raw.c | 9 +++++----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/raw.c b/net/ipv4/raw.c
index 125c1eab3eaa..f72b20131a15 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/raw.c
[...]
@@ -472,17 +473,17 @@ static int raw_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct raw_frag_vec *rfv = from;
+ char *rfv_buf;
- if (offset < rfv->hlen) {
+ if ((rfv_buf = nospec_array_ptr(rfv->hdr.c, offset, rfv->hlen))) {
And here...
[...]
MBR, Sergei
