Willy,
I propose the attached patch (extracted from 2.4.33-ow1) for inclusion
into 2.4.34-pre.
(2.6 kernels could benefit from the same change, too, but at the moment
I am dealing with proper submission of generic changes like this that
are a part of 2.4.33-ow1.)
The patch makes getsockopt(2) sanity-check the value pointed to by
the optlen argument early on. This is a security hardening measure
intended to prevent exploitation of certain potential vulnerabilities in
socket type specific getsockopt() code on UP systems.
This change has been a part of -ow patches for some years.
Thanks,
--
Alexander Peslyak <solar at openwall.com>
GPG key ID: B35D3598 fp: 6429 0D7E F130 C13E C929 6447 73C3 A290 B35D 3598
http://www.openwall.com - bringing security into open computing environments
diff -urpPX nopatch linux-2.4.33/net/socket.c linux/net/socket.c
--- linux-2.4.33/net/socket.c Wed Jan 19 17:10:14 2005
+++ linux/net/socket.c Sat Aug 12 08:51:47 2006
@@ -1307,10 +1307,18 @@ asmlinkage long sys_setsockopt(int fd, i
asmlinkage long sys_getsockopt(int fd, int level, int optname, char *optval,
int *optlen)
{
int err;
+ int len;
struct socket *sock;
if ((sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &err))!=NULL)
{
+ /* XXX: insufficient for SMP, but should be redundant anyway */
+ if (get_user(len, optlen))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ if (len < 0)
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ else
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
err=sock_getsockopt(sock,level,optname,optval,optlen);
else
