From: Chenbo Feng <fe...@google.com> Currently loading a cgroup skb eBPF program require a CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability while attaching the program to a cgroup only requires the user have CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege. We can escape the capability check when load the program just like socket filter program to make the capability requirement consistent.
Change since v1: Change the code style in order to be compliant with checkpatch.pl preference Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fe...@google.com> --- kernel/bpf/syscall.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c index 265a0d8..59da103 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c @@ -815,7 +815,9 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr) attr->kern_version != LINUX_VERSION_CODE) return -EINVAL; - if (type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER && + type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB && + !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* plain bpf_prog allocation */ -- 2.7.4