Can you stop this? You caused again a massive prefix spike/flap, and as the internet is not centered around NA (shock horror!) a number of operators in Asia and Australia go effected by your “expirment” and had no idea what was happening or why.
Get a sandbox like every other researcher, as of now we have black holed and filtered your whole ASN, and have reccomended others do the same. On Wed, 23 Jan 2019 at 1:19 am, Italo Cunha <cu...@dcc.ufmg.br> wrote: > NANOG, > > This is a reminder that this experiment will resume tomorrow > (Wednesday, Jan. 23rd). We will announce 184.164.224.0/24 carrying a > BGP attribute of type 0xff (reserved for development) between 14:00 > and 14:15 GMT. > > On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 10:05 AM Italo Cunha <cu...@dcc.ufmg.br> wrote: > > > > NANOG, > > > > We would like to inform you of an experiment to evaluate alternatives > > for speeding up adoption of BGP route origin validation (research > > paper with details [A]). > > > > Our plan is to announce prefix 184.164.224.0/24 with a valid > > standards-compliant unassigned BGP attribute from routers operated by > > the PEERING testbed [B, C]. The attribute will have flags 0xe0 > > (optional transitive [rfc4271, S4.3]), type 0xff (reserved for > > development), and size 0x20 (256bits). > > > > Our collaborators recently ran an equivalent experiment with no > > complaints or known issues [A], and so we do not anticipate any > > arising. Back in 2010, an experiment using unassigned attributes by > > RIPE and Duke University caused disruption in Internet routing due to > > a bug in Cisco routers [D, CVE-2010-3035]. Since then, this and other > > similar bugs have been patched [e.g., CVE-2013-6051], and new BGP > > attributes have been assigned (BGPsec-path) and adopted (large > > communities). We have successfully tested propagation of the > > announcements on Cisco IOS-based routers running versions 12.2(33)SRA > > and 15.3(1)S, Quagga 0.99.23.1 and 1.1.1, as well as BIRD 1.4.5 and > > 1.6.3. > > > > We plan to announce 184.164.224.0/24 from 8 PEERING locations for a > > predefined period of 15 minutes starting 14:30 GMT, from Monday to > > Thursday, between the 7th and 22nd of January, 2019 (full schedule and > > locations [E]). We will stop the experiment immediately in case any > > issues arise. > > > > Although we do not expect the experiment to cause disruption, we > > welcome feedback on its safety and especially on how to make it safer. > > We can be reached at disco-experim...@googlegroups.com. > > > > Amir Herzberg, University of Connecticut > > Ethan Katz-Bassett, Columbia University > > Haya Shulman, Fraunhofer SIT > > Ítalo Cunha, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais > > Michael Schapira, Hebrew University of Jerusalem > > Tomas Hlavacek, Fraunhofer SIT > > Yossi Gilad, MIT > > > > [A] https://conferences.sigcomm.org/hotnets/2018/program.html > > [B] http://peering.usc.edu > > [C] https://goo.gl/AFR1Cn > > [D] > https://labs.ripe.net/Members/erik/ripe-ncc-and-duke-university-bgp-experiment > > [E] https://goo.gl/nJhmx1 > -- Ben Cooper Chief Executive Officer PacketGG - Multicast M(Telstra): 0410 411 301 M(Optus): 0434 336 743 E: b...@packet.gg & b...@multicast.net.au W: https://packet.gg W: https://multicast.net.au
