I don’t agree that making RFC-1918 limitations a default in any daemon makes any sense whatsoever.
First, there are plenty of LANs out there that don’t use RFC-1918. Second, RFC-1918 doesn’t apply to IPv6 at all, and (fortunately) hardly anyone uses ULA (the IPv6 analogue to RFC-1918). I do agree that listening on all addresses might not be the best default, but building assumptions about RFC-1918 into anything (other than the assumption that they’re generally a pretty bogus way to do IP) makes little sense to me. Owen > On Mar 1, 2018, at 10:32 AM, Eric Kuhnke <eric.kuh...@gmail.com> wrote: > > On the other side: VM/VPS providers have a template based image that they > use for every type and subtype of operating system it's possible to > auto-provision. For example Ubuntu Server Xenial AMD64 or Debian Jessie or > Stretch AMD64. > > It's important that VM/VPS providers don't push fresh images that have > anything vulnerable, abusable or exploitable enabled by default. Not all > VM/VPS providers do this. Standard sane configuration choices apply such as > bind9 not being a recursive resolver by default. > > If individual Debian, CentOS, Ubuntu or whatever other distro packages for > memcached or any other daemon have "listen on all interfaces = yes" or > "listen on non-RFC1918 IP ranges = yes" turned on in their respective > configurations, that would be an issue to take up with the package > maintainers for the daemons. > > > > On Wed, Feb 28, 2018 at 4:31 AM, Job Snijders <j...@ntt.net> wrote: > >> Dear all, >> >> Before the group takes on the pitchforks and torches and travels down to >> the hosting providers' headquarters - let's take a step back and look at >> the root of this issue: the memcached software has failed both the >> Internet community and its own memcached users. >> >> It is INSANE that memcached is/was[1] shipping with default settings >> that make the daemon listen and respond on UDP on INADDR_ANY. Did nobody >> take notes during the protocol wars where we were fodder for all the >> CHARGEN & NTP ordnance? >> >> The memcached software shipped with a crazy default that required no >> authentication - allowing everyone to interact with the daemon. This is >> an incredibly risky proposition for memcached users from a >> confidentiality perspective; and on top of that the amplification factor >> is up to 15,000x. WHAT?! >> >> And this isn't even new information, open key/value stores have been a >> security research topic for a number of years, these folks reported that >> in the 2015/2016 time frame they observed more than 100,000 open >> memcached instances: https://aperture-labs.org/pdf/safeconf16.pdf >> >> Vendors need to ensure that a default installation of their software >> does not pose an immediate liability to the user itself and those around >> them. No software is deployed in a vacuum. >> >> A great example of how to approach things is the behavior of the >> PowerDNS DNS recursor: this recursor - out of the box - binds to only >> 127.0.0.1, and blocks queries from RFC 1918 space. An operator has to >> consciously perform multiple steps to make it into the danger zone. >> This is how things should be. >> >> Kind regards, >> >> Job >> >> [1]: https://github.com/memcached/memcached/commit/ >> dbb7a8af90054bf4ef51f5814ef7ceb17d83d974 >> >> ps. promiscuous defaults are bad, mmkay? >> Ask your BGP vendor for RFC 8212 support today! :-) >>
