For transit maybe Cogent should have dropped the route, so they did not
advertize a route to peers that included null routed parts.
Den 16/02/2017 kl. 21.52 skrev Jean-Francois Mezei:
On 2017-02-16 14:59, Sadiq Saif wrote:
From -
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/02/a-court-order-blocked-pirate-sites-that-werent-supposed-to-be-blocked/
Many thanks.
pardon my ignorance here, but question:
For an outfit such as Cogent which acts not only as a transit provider,
but also edge provider to large end users, can it easily implement such
a court order to block only edge interfaces and not to its transit
infrastructure?
(aka: propagate null routes for 104.31.19.30 only to interfaces that
lead to end users, but leave core/GBP aspects without the block.)
Or is BGP and any internal routing protocols so intermingled that it
becomes hard to manage such blocks ?
The difficulty for network to block traffic becomes an important
argument when trying to convince governments that blocking should not be
done. (ex: Québec government wanting to block access to gambling sites
except its own).
