On 2/6/17 2:31 PM, William Herrin wrote:
This afternoon's panel about IoT's lack of security got me thinking...
On the issue of ISPs unable to act on insecure devices because they
can't detect the devices until they're compromised and then only have
the largest hammer (full account ban) to act...
What about some kind of requirement or convention that upon boot and
successful attachment to the network (and maybe once a month
thereafter), any IoT device must _by default_ emit a UDP packet to an
anycast address reserved for the purpose which identifies the device
model and software build. The ISP can capture traffic to that anycast
address, compare the data against a list of devices known to be
defective and, if desired, respond with a fail message. If the IoT
device receives the fail message, it must try to report the problem to
its owner and remove its default route so that it can only communicate
on the local lan. The user can override the fail and if desired
configure the device not to emit the init messages at all. But by
default the ISP is allowed to disable the device by responding to the
init message.
Uh, yuck at many levels. Do you leak your cisco ios versions to the
internet?
Do you really want the responsibility for the remote kill switch for IoT
S&M gear?
And of course, you're depending on rfc 3514, right?
Mike
