It's possible you might have wanted to read the link for the context that pointed this out as sarcastic hyperbole, though the text as-is could (unfortunately) have been read as serious.

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On Mon 2016-Oct-24 17:17:43 -0500, Mike Hammett <na...@ics-il.net> wrote:

There's a buffer overrun in some software, so let's just remove all passwords 
(and keys), since they can get in anyway.





Just pointing out flawed logic.




-----
Mike Hammett
Intelligent Computing Solutions
http://www.ics-il.com

Midwest-IX
http://www.midwest-ix.com

----- Original Message -----

From: "J. Oquendo" <joque...@e-fensive.net>
To: "Steve Mikulasik" <steve.mikula...@civeo.com>
Cc: nanog@nanog.org
Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 3:53:25 PM
Subject: Re: Spitballing IoT Security

On Mon, 24 Oct 2016, Steve Mikulasik wrote:

if we automatically blackholed those IPs as they get updated it could put a big 
dent in the effectiveness of Zeus.


That would involve someone lifting a finger and implement
a config change. Much easier to implement BCP38 or was it
RFC 4732? Would never work the moment someone has to lift
a finger.

/*
I think I'll change my position on BCP38. It's pointless to try
blocking spoofed source addresses because:

* It doesn't solve every single problem
* It means more effort for service providers
* It requires more CPU processing power
* Using it will generate smarter "black hats".

https://www.nanog.org/mailinglist/mailarchives/old_archive/2004-10/msg00132.html

*/


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SGFA, SGFE, C|EH, CNDA, CHFI, OSCP, CPT, RWSP, GREM

"Where ignorance is our master, there is no possibility of
real peace" - Dalai Lama

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