On Sunday, September 25, 2016, Jay Farrell via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote:
> And of course Brian Krebs has a thing or two to say, not the least is which > to push for BCP38 (good luck with that, right?). > > https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/09/the-democratization-of-censorship/ > > Yeh, bcp38 is not a viable solution. As long as their is one spoof capable network on the net, the problem will not be solved. While bcp38 is a true bcp, it is not a solution. It will not, and has not, moved the needle. A solution is aggregating the telemetry of source IP addresses in the botnet and assigning blame and liability to the owners of the IP addresses / host ASN. The networks can then use AUP to shutdown the bot members. As where http://openntpproject.org/ was a proactive approach, Kreb's data can be reactive approach. And since the data is evidence of a crime, the network operators can enforce the AUP. The attack did happen. This ip was involved. Remediation is required. >From there, the host ASN can > On Sun, Sep 25, 2016 at 12:43 AM, Jay R. Ashworth <j...@baylink.com > <javascript:;>> wrote: > > > ----- Original Message ----- > > > From: "Jay Farrell via NANOG" <nanog@nanog.org <javascript:;>> > > > > > And of course on windows ipconfig /flushdns > > > > > > Still I had to wait for my corporate caching servers to update; I think > > the > > > TTL on the old A record was an hour. > > > > Are big eyeball networks still flooring A record TTLs on resolution? > > > > Cheers, > > -- jra > > -- > > Jay R. Ashworth Baylink > > j...@baylink.com <javascript:;> > > Designer The Things I Think RFC > > 2100 > > Ashworth & Associates http://www.bcp38.info 2000 Land > > Rover DII > > St Petersburg FL USA BCP38: Ask For It By Name! +1 727 647 > > 1274 > > >
