On Tue, Sep 2, 2014 at 11:25 AM, Job Snijders <j...@instituut.net> wrote: > On Tue, Sep 02, 2014 at 03:08:28PM +0000, Sriram, Kotikalapudi wrote: >> The example that I gave was not that. In my example, C has legitimate >> ownership of the less specific (e.g., 192.0.2.0/23). D is malicious >> and attempting to hijack a subprefix (e.g., 192.0.2.0/24). >> Importantly, C has a created a ROA for 192.0.2.0/23 only to protect >> its address space, but currently *does not advertise* this prefix or >> any part of it. So D's more specific announcement (hijack) is >> 'Invalid' in this scenario, but the 'Loose' mode operation would >> accept/install D's route. Am I right about that? If yes, that is the >> side effect or CON that I was trying to highlight. > > You are right in your observation. > > What is the real damage of hijacking a prefix which is not in use?
'not in use' ... where? What if the 'owner' of the block has the block only routed 'internally' (either behind gateways/firewalls/airgaps or just inside their ASN) The expectation of the 'owner' is that they are using the space and it's not routed 'somewhere else', right? -chris