Unfortunately, it is way too easy for people to inject routes into the global routing system.
I think most of the folks on the list can attest to that. :-) - ferg On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 1:20 AM, Martin T <m4rtn...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, > > as probably many of you know, it's possible to create a "route" object > to RIPE database for an address space which is allocated outside the > RIPE region using the RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT maintainer object. For example > an address space is from APNIC or ARIN region and AS is from RIPE > region. For example a LIR in RIPE region creates a "route" object to > RIPE database for 157.166.266.0/24(used by Turner Broadcasting System) > prefix without having written permission from Turner Broadcasting > System and as this LIR uses up-link providers who create prefix > filters automatically according to RADb database entries, this ISP is > soon able to announce this 157.166.266.0/24 prefix to Internet. This > should disturb the availability of the real 157.166.266.0/24 network > on Internet? Has there been such situations in history? Isn't there a > method against such hijacking? Or have I misunderstood something and > this isn't possible? > > > regards, > Martin > -- "Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson fergdawgster(at)gmail.com
