On 11/14/11 10:24 , Joe Greco wrote: >> Sure, anytime there's an attack or failure on a SCADA network that >> wouldn't have occurred had it been air-gapped, it's easy for people to >> knee-jerk a "SCADA networks should be airgapped" response. But that's >> not really intelligent commentary unless you carefully consider what >> risks are associated with air-gapping the network. > > Not to mention that it's not the only way for these things to get > infected. Getting fixated on air-gapping is unrealistically ignoring > the other threats out there. > > There needs to be a whole lot more security work done on SCADA nets.
Stuxnet should provide a fairly illustrative example. It doesn't really matter how well isolated from direct access it is if it has a soft gooey center and a willing attacker. > ... JG
