Shouldn't such apps be checking the content they receive back from a
server anyway?
Regardless of if they think they're getting to the right server (due to
a bogus non-NXDOMAIN response) there should be some sort of validation
in place.. otherwise you're open in any sort of man-in-the-middle attack.
I think the issue is more that older apps would expect that if they can
get a response then everything is ok.. perhaps this simply an outdated
method and needs to be rethought.
valdis.kletni...@vt.edu wrote:
On Mon, 09 Nov 2009 15:04:06 PST, Bill Stewart said:
For instance, returning the IP address of your company's port-80 web
server instead of NXDOMAIN
not only breaks non-port-80-http applications
Remember this...
There is one special case for which I don't mind having DNS servers
lie about query results,
which is the phishing/malware protection service. In that case, the
DNS response is redirecting you to
the IP address of a server that'll tell you
"You really didn't want to visit PayPa11.com - it's a fake" or
"You really didn't want to visit
dgfdsgsdfgdfgsdfgsfd.example.ru - it's malware".
It's technically broken, but you really _didn't_ want to go there anyway.
It's a bit friendlier to administrators and security people if the
response page gives you the
Returning bogus non-NXODMAIN gives non-port-80-http apps heartburn as well.
