In response to feedback from operational security communities, CAIDA's source address validation measurement project (https://spoofer.caida.org) is automatically generating monthly reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which we received packets with a spoofed source address. We are publishing these reports to network and security operations lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational contacts in these ASes.
This report summarises tests conducted within usa, can. Inferred improvements during Sep 2024: ASN Name Fixed-By 1403 EBOX 2024-09-24 Further information for the inferred remediation is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/remedy.php Source Address Validation issues inferred during Sep 2024: ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed 40676 AS40676 2016-08-29 2024-09-29 27364 ACS-INTERNET 2016-09-27 2024-09-25 12083 WOW-INTERNET 2016-11-09 2024-09-29 701 UUNET 2017-06-14 2024-09-01 2152 CSUNET-NW 2017-11-08 2024-09-25 33363 BHN-33363 2018-11-29 2024-09-07 21804 ACCESS-SK 2019-06-09 2024-09-30 12183 TALKIE-COMMUNICATIONS 2022-12-10 2024-09-28 3701 NERONET 2023-04-18 2024-09-28 400282 2023-04-27 2024-09-27 393577 SCCNET 2023-05-03 2024-09-29 202400 2023-05-08 2024-09-30 61461 Airtek Solutions C.A. 2023-05-13 2024-09-25 20119 ARROW 2023-10-19 2024-09-25 394684 WISPERNET 2024-01-17 2024-09-28 394195 CLEARNETWORX 2024-03-22 2024-09-30 20326 TERASWITCH 2024-04-15 2024-09-09 214961 2024-05-14 2024-09-13 393530 TLU 2024-05-22 2024-09-26 19935 CRRS 2024-05-29 2024-09-29 57308 Rossvyazinform 2024-08-10 2024-09-29 3801 MISNET 2024-09-09 2024-09-27 40959 HOSTMASTER 2024-09-16 2024-09-16 30475 WEHOSTWEBSITES-COM 2024-09-30 2024-09-30 Further information for these tests where we received spoofed packets is available at: https://spoofer.caida.org/recent_tests.php?country_include=usa,can&no_block=1 Please send any feedback or suggestions to spoofer-i...@caida.org
