" We can seriously lose NAT for v6 and not lose anything of worth."
I'm not going to participate in the security conversation, but we do absolutely need something to fill the role of NAT in v6. If it's already there or not, I don't know. Use case: Joe's Taco Shop. Joe doesn't want a down Internet connection to prevent transactions from completing, so he purchases two diverse broadband connections, say a cable connection and a DSL connection. When ISP fails, traffic will have to exit ISP B. He's not getting a /48, LOA, BGP, etc. to do it on his own, he's just going to do simple NAT. ----- Mike Hammett Intelligent Computing Solutions http://www.ics-il.com Midwest-IX http://www.midwest-ix.com ----- Original Message ----- From: "Michael Thomas" <m...@mtcc.com> To: nanog@nanog.org Sent: Saturday, February 17, 2024 12:50:46 PM Subject: Re: IPv6 uptake On 2/17/24 10:26 AM, Owen DeLong via NANOG wrote: > >> On Feb 16, 2024, at 14:20, Jay R. Ashworth <j...@baylink.com> wrote: >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: "Justin Streiner" <strein...@gmail.com> >>> 4. Getting people to unlearn the "NAT=Security" mindset that we were forced >>> to accept in the v4 world. >> NAT doesn't "equal" security. >> >> But it is certainly a *component* of security, placing control of what >> internal >> nodes are accessible from the outside in the hands of the people inside. > Uh, no… no it is not. Stateful inspection (which the kind of NAT (actually > NAPT) you are assuming here depends on) is a component of security. You can > do stateful inspection without mutilating the header and have all the same > security benefits without losing or complicating the audit trail. Exactly. As I said elsewhere, the security properties of NAT were a post-hoc rationalization. In the mean time, it has taken on its own life as if not NAT'ing (but still having stateful firewalls) would end the known security universe. We can seriously lose NAT for v6 and not lose anything of worth. Mike
