>>> On Tue, Jan 30, 2024 at 8:11 AM Bill Woodcock <wo...@pch.net> wrote: >>> Not exactly down… they just busted their DNSSEC, or their domain got >>> hijacked or something. Bad DNSKEY records. >> >> On Jan 31, 2024, at 06:34, Eric Kuhnke <eric.kuh...@gmail.com> wrote: >> Not necessarily saying these are related, but given the current geopolitical >> situation, not beyond the realm of possibility that this is the result of >> 'something else' gone wrong.
Phil Kulin posted a more specific timeline on dns-ops: > Begin forwarded message: > > From: Phil Kulin <sch...@gmail.com> > Subject: Re: [dns-operations] .RU zone failed ZSK rotation > Date: January 31, 2024 at 03:34:40 GMT+1 > To: Sergey Myasoedov <s...@netartgroup.com> > Cc: dns-operati...@lists.dns-oarc.net > > Timeline: > 2024-01-30 12:29:44 UTC: Last correct answer before outage (SOA SN: > 4058855): https://dnsviz.net/d/ru/ZbjruA/dnssec/ > 2024-01-30 15:27:27 UTC: First bad answer (SOA SN: 4058857): > https://dnsviz.net/d/ru/ZbkVXw/dnssec/ > 2024-01-30 17:27:35 UTC: Resigning attempt (SOA SN: 4058857 and > 4058858): https://dnsviz.net/d/ru/Zbkxhw/dnssec/ > 2024-01-30 17:59:46 UTC: Recovering process started (SOA SN: 4058857 > and 4058857 and 4058858): https://dnsviz.net/d/ru/Zbk5Eg/dnssec/ > 2024-01-30 19:07:29 UTC: First completely good answer (SOA SN: > 4058856): https://dnsviz.net/d/ru/ZblI8Q/dnssec/ There’s no reason to think that any external parties influenced this. Ockham’s razor. So many euphemisms suggest themselves in a situation like this… Own-goal, one-car-accident, etc. Except that we all know that one small thing overlooked and we’ll be in their shoes tomorrow. All geopolitics aside, my empathy to the .RU operator. -Bill
signature.asc
Description: Message signed with OpenPGP
