> > If, for any reason, you want to opt out from us using your ASN for our > experiments, you can do so in the following form before May 9: > > https://forms.gle/ZvZaodndPhCqMvR89 >
If I am interpreting this correctly that you are just going to yolo a bunch of random ASNs to poison paths with, perhaps you should consider getting explicit permission for the ASNs you want to use instead. A lot of operators monitor the DFZ for prefixes with their ASN in the path, and wouldn't appreciate random support tickets because their NOC got some alert. :) On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 10:02 AM Alexandros Milolidakis <amilo...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi NANOG, > > We are a group of researchers from the KTH Royal Institute of Technology > (Sweden). > > Starting from May 9 until May 31, we plan to conduct a research study > involving AS-PATH poisoning to measure how reliable route collectors are to > report BGP poisoned routes. > > We will use the PEERING Testbed [1] to announce the following two prefixes: > > - 184.164.236.0/24 > > - 184.164.237.0/24 > > for our AS-path poisoning experiments. > > The above experimental prefixes do not host any production services, hence > user traffic will *not* be affected. > > Furthermore, we will always start the AS-PATH with the correct ASN as the > origin. > > Lastly, to keep the AS-PATH short, we will announce no more than four > Poisoned ASNs per announcement. The frequency of the announcements will not > exceed four per hour. > > If, for any reason, you want to opt out from us using your ASN for our > experiments, you can do so in the following form before May 9: > > https://forms.gle/ZvZaodndPhCqMvR89 > > I remain at your disposal for any questions. > > Best regards, > > Alexandros > > [1] https://peering.ee.columbia.edu/ >
