Looks like the press picked this up. Paywalled though! https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/04/24/pentagon-internet-address-mystery/
On Tue, Mar 16, 2021 at 3:03 AM Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> wrote: > > > On Mar 15, 2021, at 15:07 , Tom Beecher <beec...@beecher.cc> wrote: > > I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of >> a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses >> happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is >> behind this huge transfer of wealth. >> >> Don’t you? >> > > On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:35 PM Mel Beckman <m...@beckman.org> wrote: > >> Owen, >> >> I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes ( >> 7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced >> under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago,” which, >> according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information >> Center”. >> > > Somehow, I’m of the impression that DoD is quite capable of defending > their own property if necessary. I’m also not of the same belief as you > that GRSCORP was just formed a few months ago. It seems to have bounced > back and forth between Florida and Delaware one or more times, but that’s > not all that uncommon for a corporation physically located in Florida. > Corporations change their state of incorporation somewhat regularly for a > variety of legal forum shopping purposes, including but not limited to tax > advantages, court jurisdictional advantages, etc. > > > I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of >> a massive government-owned block of well over sixteen million IP addresses >> happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is >> behind this huge transfer of wealth. >> > > I don’t see a transfer of wealth. I see DOD finally having a contractor > originate their prefixes in order to make life more difficult for > squatters, hijackers, and other miscreants. About time, if you ask me. I > mean, I’m sure that in order to provide that level of sink-hole, GRSCORP is > having to pay some hefty transit bills and maintain some significant > infrastructure and likely passing all that cost along to DoD at a hefty > markup, so I suppose that’s some level of transfer of wealth, but as DoD > contracts go, I somehow don’t think this one would be regarded as > “significant”. > > Owen > > >> Don’t you? >> >> -mel beckman >> >> On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog@nanog.org> >> wrote: >> >> According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl >> Resource Systems, LLC was registered in Delaware on September 8, 2020. >> Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on >> September 11, september 14, 2020 >> It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in >> Florida and moved the company address there. >> >> I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m >> a bit confused what you are on about. >> >> Owen >> >> On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <avel...@misaka.io> wrote: >> >> Hi John, >> >> My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL >> RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its existence. >> >> When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to >> provide a Certificate of Good Standing and we had to pay the state to order >> it. >> >> However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required >> or ARIN didn't validate it in this case. >> >> Regards, >> Siyuan >> >> On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcur...@arin.net> wrote: >> >>> On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <avel...@misaka.io> wrote: >>> >>> >>> Hi Folks, >>> >>> Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes ( >>> 7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 and bunch of /22s) are now announced >>> under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was just formed a few months ago. >>> >>> It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized? >>> >>> >>> Siyuan - >>> >>> If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks >>> are being routed as intended by verification with their listed technical >>> contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 >>> >>> As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is >>> not at all a reliable indicator of the potential for valid routing of a >>> given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated >>> address space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing >>> otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises when issued space suddenly >>> becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for >>> some destinations." >>> >>> Thanks! >>> /John >>> >>> John Curran >>> President and CEO >>> American Registry for Internet Numbers >>> >>> >> >