On Fri, 2 Jan 2009 16:13:45 -0500
Deepak Jain <dee...@ai.net> wrote:

> > If done properly, that's actually an easier task: you build the
> > update key into the browser.  When it pulls in an update, it
> > verifies that it was signed with the proper key.
> > 
> 
> If you build it into the browser, how do you revoke it when someone
> throws 2000 PS3s to crack it, or your hash, or your [pick algorithmic
> mistake here].
> 
If you use bad crypto, you lose no matter what.  If you use good
crypto, 2,000,000,000 PS3s won't do the job.

                --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb

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