[PATCH] allow short and long key ID user input in any pgp_long_ids mode for crypt_*

[Eike Rathke]

# HG changeset patch
# User Eike Rathke <er...@erack.de>
# Date 1421599842 -3600
# Node ID ed00f80073ea372e995fc8d4611991a2e2e08672
# Parent  5c6115fba7ac1efbe1f475b6e3bbe1898f3472bf
allow short and long key ID user input in any pgp_long_ids mode for crypt_*

The following did not work, e.g. when leaving a key list, and at the "Sign as"
or "Encrypt to" prompt attempting to enter a key ID:
* set pgp_long_ids=no
  * enter a long key ID, with or without leading 0x
* set pgp_long_ids=yes
  * enter a short key ID without leading 0x

Specifically entering a long key ID should always be possible as evil32.com
has shown.

This also cleans up the logic used to determine the matching condition, which
was quite convoluted.. it even slightly speeds up the loop as less string
operations are involved in the inner condition.

This only changes how the result obtained from the crypt_* gpgme interface is
filtered.

diff --git a/crypt-gpgme.c b/crypt-gpgme.c
--- a/crypt-gpgme.c
+++ b/crypt-gpgme.c
@@ -179,6 +179,34 @@
   return s;
 }
 
+/* Return the long keyID for the key K. */
+static const char *crypt_long_keyid (crypt_key_t *k)
+{
+  const char *s = "????????????????";
+
+  if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys)
+    {
+      s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid;
+    }
+
+  return s;
+}
+
+/* Return the short keyID for the key K. */
+static const char *crypt_short_keyid (crypt_key_t *k)
+{
+  const char *s = "????????";
+
+  if (k->kobj && k->kobj->subkeys)
+    {
+      s = k->kobj->subkeys->keyid;
+      if (strlen (s) == 16)
+        s += 8;
+    }
+
+  return s;
+}
+
 /* Return the hexstring fingerprint from the key K. */
 static const char *crypt_fpr (crypt_key_t *k)
 {
@@ -4130,6 +4158,7 @@
   crypt_key_t *matches = NULL;
   crypt_key_t **matches_endp = &matches;
   crypt_key_t *k;
+  const char *ps, *pl;
 
   mutt_message (_("Looking for keys matching \"%s\"..."), p);
 
@@ -4141,6 +4170,19 @@
 
   if (!keys)
     return NULL;
+
+  /* User input may be short or long key ID, independent of OPTPGPLONGIDS.
+   * crypt_key_t->keyid should always contain a long key ID without 0x.
+   * Strip leading "0x" before loops so it doesn't have to be done over and
+   * over again, and prepare pl and ps to simplify logic in the loop's inner
+   * condition.
+   */
+  pl = (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) ? p + 2 : p);
+  ps = (mutt_strlen (pl) == 16 ? pl + 8 : pl);
+
+  /* If ps != pl it means a long ID (or name of 16 characters) was given, do
+   * not attempt to match short IDs then. Also, it is unnecessary to try to
+   * match pl against long IDs if ps == pl as pl could not be a long ID. */
   
   for (k = keys; k; k = k->next)
     {
@@ -4148,15 +4190,11 @@
         continue;
 
       dprint (5, (debugfile, "crypt_getkeybystr: matching \"%s\" against "
-                  "key %s, \"%s\": ",  p, crypt_keyid (k), k->uid));
+                  "key %s, \"%s\": ",  p, crypt_long_keyid (k), k->uid));
 
       if (!*p
-          || !mutt_strcasecmp (p, crypt_keyid (k))
-          || (!mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2)
-              && !mutt_strcasecmp (p + 2, crypt_keyid (k)))
-          || (option (OPTPGPLONGIDS)
-              && !mutt_strncasecmp (p, "0x", 2) 
-              && !mutt_strcasecmp (p + 2, crypt_keyid (k) + 8))
+          || (ps != pl && mutt_strcasecmp (pl, crypt_long_keyid (k)) == 0)
+          || (ps == pl && mutt_strcasecmp (ps, crypt_short_keyid (k)) == 0)
           || mutt_stristr (k->uid, p))
         {
           crypt_key_t *tmp;

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