On Tue, 2010-11-23 at 15:28 -0500, Brad Tilley wrote: > Nick Holland wrote: > > > what's changed? > > Layering? Nope. > > Crappy programming? Nope. > > Better hardware? not really. > > Features-before-security? Nope. > > Good points. The goals of virtualization are, easy management, power > savings, quick provisioning and deployment, redundancy, etc. When you > talk about security and virtualization at the guest level, the > prevailing attitude is, "If it gets hacked, we'll just restore it from a > known good snapshot... problem solved."
With the way most of those app stacks are it's more like "We'll restore it from snapshot when one of our admins or developers fat fingers and blows it all to hell. We honestly can't distinguish malicious behavior from a 3rd party from our existing application bugs." > > I don't hear much talk at all about the host machine and security (the > real server that hosts all the pretend servers is just assumed to be > OK). There just seems to be a lot of trust in the vendors. No more trust than what they are putting into the OS distributions management chooses nor the application stacks management chooses. What's the point of compromising the OS or hypervisors when the memcached servers are open to the entire Internet, and the app stack was designed to make injection attacks easy. Chris Dukes
