Apparently, it has already been patched on OpenBSD.

>From https://www.krackattacks.com/

  When did you first notify vendors about the vulnerability?

  We sent out notifications to vendors whose products we tested ourselves
  around 14 July 2017. After communicating with these vendors, we realized
  how widespread the weaknesses we discovered are (only then did I truly
  convince myself it was indeed a protocol weaknesses and not a set of
  implementation bugs). At that point, we decided to let CERT/CC help with
  the disclosure of the vulnerabilities. In turn, CERT/CC sent out a broad
  notification to vendors on 28 August 2017.

  Why did OpenBSD silently release a patch before the embargo?

  OpenBSD was notified of the vulnerability on 15 July 2017, before
  CERT/CC was involved in the coordination. Quite quickly, Theo de Raadt
  replied and critiqued the tentative disclosure deadline: In the open
  source world, if a person writes a diff and has to sit on it for a
  month, that is very discouraging. Note that I wrote and included a
  suggested diff for OpenBSD already, and that at the time the tentative
  disclosure deadline was around the end of August. As a compromise, I
  allowed them to silently patch the vulnerability. In hindsight this was
  a bad decision, since others might rediscover the vulnerability by
  inspecting their silent patch. To avoid this problem in the future,
  OpenBSD will now receive vulnerability notifications closer to the end
  of an embargo.

Eric

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