On Tue, Mar 5, 2013 at 1:04 PM, Stuart Henderson <s...@spacehopper.org> wrote:
>> >> I am aware that "more secure" depends on the situation, such a whether
>> >> the login is happening from a trusted terminal, how is the secret key
>> >> stored on the device that is generating TOTP, is the public key
>> >> encrypted, etc. But what are your thoughts in general?
>> >
>> > I think it totally depends on the situation and can't really be applied
>> > in general.. Either of them can be made to be unsafe.
>>
>> That makes sense. I guess it all depends on your trust relationship
>> with the party whom you are allowing to connect to your hosts.
>
> To illustrate: if you don't trust users to keep their authorized_keys
> file encrypted, you might want to require additional authentication (password
> or OTP). Or if you don't want the replay window that TOTP gives then you
> might want the second factor of a public key authentication.

100% agree. Having unencrypted private keys was one of the reasons
that I have started looking into OTP/TOTP. At this point, I think it
is probably better to force "untrusted" users (those who cannot be
trusted to keep their private keys encrypted) to use TOTP with
sufficiently long passwords (login_totp-and-pwd) and allow trusted
users a bit more freedom.

But as you have mentioned before, it all depends on the situation and
use case, so not a general recommendation.

>> > OpenSSH has this in -current, see sshd_config(5) AuthenticationMethods.
>>
>> That is great! I will definitely give it a go.
>
> It might also be worth pointing out that this can be used in a Match
> block, therefore if wanted you can permit access from known addresses of
> secured hosts with just an SSH key, but require an additional password/OTP
> for connections from other addresses.

This is definitely something that I will use more of as the
configuration starts to get more complex.

In general, the more I use OpenBSD (and Open* friends), the more I
love it. The simplicity and elegance of these systems is just too
awesome! :)

Thanks!
--peter

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